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PRIVATE RIGHTS FOR THE
PUBLIC GOOD?
J. Janewa OseiTutu*
"IP delivers safe products to our homes by allowing consumers to iden-
tify respected and safe brands."'
"Ruling ensures access: Generic Version Upheld in India, in a Blow to
Big Companies."2 The counterfeit medicines discussion is an example of
how the use of a turbid rationale for greater intellectual property protec-
tions serves sophisticated private interests while potentially harming the
public interest.3 The risk of harm created by counterfeit medicines pro-
vides a compelling counter-narrative to the access to medicines critique
of intellectual property rights.4 Intellectual property advocates and the
pharmaceutical industry have portrayed poor global enforcement of intel-
lectual property rights as contributing to the proliferation of dangerous
counterfeit medications.5 Yet, the deliberate linkage in the literature be-
tween weak intellectual property rights and the harms caused by counter-
feit medicines provides a justification for new international treaties, such
as the recent Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, 6 that require in-
creased government enforcement of intellectual property rights, even
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ence, and the participants of the Stetson Scholarship Forum for their comments on
presentations of this Article at various stages. I am grateful to Thomas Fossler, Shubha
Ghosh, Adil Ahmad Haque, Cynthia Ho, Charles Jalloh, Henning Ruse Khan, Melissa
Luttrell, Joelle Moreno, Markus Wagner, and Peter Yu for their helpful discussions and
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1. David Hirschmann, Op-Eds., Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement-A Win for All
Countries, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH (Sept. 12, 2012), available at http://www.uschamber
.com/press/opeds/trans-pacific-partnership-agreement-win-all-countries.
2. Gardiner Harris & Katie Thomas, Low Cost Drugs in Poor Nations Get Lift in
Court: Ruling Ensures Access-Generic Version Upheld in India, in a Blow to Big Compa-
nies, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 2, 2013, at Al.
3. Id.
4. James M. Cooper, Conference Report, Piracy 101, 36 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 89,
100-03 (2005); Harris & Thomas, supra note 2.
5. Letter from Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. to Gloria Blue, Exec. Sec'y of the
Trade Policy Staff Comm., Exec. Office of the President of U.S.-Trans-Pac. P'ship Agree-
ment, USTR-2009-0041 (Jan. 25, 2010), available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/gol
tpp.
6. Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), Dec. 3, 2010, 50 I.L.M. 243.
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where the public interest justifications are relatively weak.7 The counter-
feit medicines narrative gives private industry a public interest rationale
instead of a profit-oriented rationale for demanding government enforce-
ment of private intellectual property rights.8 This Article advocates a
public interest test to determine when, and to what extent, government
monitoring and enforcement of intellectual property rights is warranted.
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I. INTRODUCTIONINTELLECTUAL property rights, and patent rights in particular, are
blamed for creating barriers to access to medicines. 9 Nonetheless,
transnational corporations convinced governments of the need for in-
creased enforcement of intellectual property rights.10 Moreover, it seems
7. Cooper, supra note 4, at 100-03.
8. Harris & Thomas, supra note 2.
9. Id.
10. ExEc. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, COUNTERFEIT PHARMACEUTICAL INTER-
AGENCY WORKING GROUP REPORT TO THE VICE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND
TO CONGRESS, 1 (2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/
IPEC/PharmaReportFinal.pdf.
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that corporations have convinced governments to take on the role of en-
forcer on their behalf. According to the U.S. Government, enforcing our
intellectual property rights is not only important for the U.S. economy, it
is "of paramount importance to protect the public health."'
How is it that ordinary citizens, including those who cannot afford their
medicines, will potentially shoulder the cost of enforcing these private
intangible rights? Further, what is the rationale for moving a traditionally
privately enforced right further into the realm of government responsibil-
ity? This Article explores whether the risk posed by counterfeit medicines
can adequately justify public enforcement of private intangible rights.
The suggestion that increased enforcement of intellectual property rights
benefits the public has been particularly compelling in the context of
counterfeit medicines due to the intimation that there is some health and
safety benefit to the public.12 Naturally, we would all like to take our
medications knowing that they will help to heal us, not make us sicker or
kill us. To this end, the U.S. Government established a Counterfeit Phar-
maceutical Inter-Agency Working Group, which studied the issue and
prepared a report containing a number of legislative recommendations
for submission to the Vice President and to Congress.' 3
As this Article argues, even if enforcing intellectual property rights can
help curb the trade in counterfeit medicines, the role of intellectual prop-
erty is limited.14 Moreover the safety argument is unjustifiably extended
to intellectual property protected goods in general.' 5 This Article con-
cludes that potential health risks from counterfeit medicines provide a
powerful counter-narrative to the "access to medicines" critique of intel-
lectual property. The dangers created by counterfeit medicines16 thereby
artificially bolster the case for public enforcement of private intellectual
property rights.
There are multiple layers to the global trend towards maximum intel-
lectual property protection. One part of this trend involves the increase in
intellectual property rights through the creation of global standards, and
the other part is the enforcement of those standards.' 7 Two interrelated
questions arise. First, what is the relevance of increased intellectual prop-
erty rights to enhancing the public welfare? Second, what role should
11. Id. at 1.
12. Id. at 1.
13. Id. The working group was comprised of the Intellectual Property Enforcement
Coordinator, the Food and Drug Administration, the U.S. Customs and Border Patrol, the
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the Departments of Justice, State, and
Commerce. Id.
14. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, INTERNATIONAL MEDICAL PRODUCTs ANTI-
COUNTERFEITING TASKFORCE, COUNTERFEIT DRUGs KILL! (2008), available at http://www
.who-intlimpact/FinalBrochureWHA2008a.pdf.
15. Cooper, supra note 4, at 100-03.
16. Note that counterfeit medicines are not generic medicines. A generic medicine is
normally a safe, legitimate off-patent version of a drug. A counterfeit medicine, on the
other hand, can be described as a fake or illegitimate version of a patented drug or a fake
or illegitimate version of a generic drug.
17. Hirschmann, supra note 1.
2013]1 769
SMU LAW REVIEW
governments have in monitoring and enforcing such rights? This Article
focuses primarily on the second question. That is, when, and to what ex-
tent, should public resources be used to monitor and enforce private
rights that are typically held by large multinational corporations? Intel-
lectual property rights are private rights that are normally enforced by
the rights holders.18 Yet, international intellectual property agreements,
like the recent Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement1 9 (ACTA), increas-
ingly contemplate government monitoring and enforcement of these
rights,20 and industry associations requested similar measures in the
highly secretive Trans-Pacific Partnership 21 (TPP) negotiations. Drawing
on the power of the state has the practical effect of strengthening protec-
tion for intellectual property rights.22
In this context, public enforcement refers to the requirement that gov-
ernment authorities actively monitor intellectual property infringing ac-
tivities and assume responsibility for prosecuting apparent violations of
intellectual property law.2 3 This means that the burden and cost of moni-
toring and enforcing intellectual property rights shift from private rights
holders to the public purse, and monitoring and enforcing intellectual
property rights is expensive.24 But does this shift from private enforce-
18. Intellectual property rights are private rights, which the right holder is responsible
for monitoring and enforcing. These are not public or quasi-public rights. Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) pmbl., Apr. 15, 1994, 1869
U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197, 1198; see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125 (2012). There are some
limited exceptions to this to the extent that intellectual property offences have been
criminalized or enforced at the border. Cynthia M. Ho, Global Access to Medicine: The
Influence of Competing Patent Perspectives, 35 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1, 59-62 (2011); Irina
D. Manta, The Puzzle of Criminal Sanctions for Intellectual Property Infringement, 24
HARV. J.L. TECH. 469, 469 (2011).
19. See ACTA, supra note 6.
20. Id. pmbl. ("Noting further that the proliferation of counterfeit and pirated goods,
as well as of services that distribute infringing material, undermines legitimate trade and
sustainable development of the world economy, causes significant financial losses for right
holders and for legitimate businesses, and, in some cases, provides a source of revenue for
organized crime and otherwise poses risks to the public; Desiring to combat such prolifera-
tion through enhanced international cooperation and more effective international enforce-
ment; Intending to provide effective and appropriate means, complementing the TRIPS
Agreement, for the enforcement of intellectual property rights, taking into account differ-
ences in their respective legal systems and practices.").
21. Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP): 19th Round of Negotiations Set for Bandar Seri
Begawan, Brunei-August 23-30, 2013, OFFICE U.S. TRADE REP., http://www.ustr.gov/tpp
(last visited Oct. 1, 2013).
22. Cooper, supra note 4, at 101-03.
23. UNITED STATES CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, WHAT EVERY MEMBER OF
THE TRADE COMMUNITY SHOULD KNow ABouT: CBP ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTs-AN INFORMED COMPLIANCE PUBLICATION (2012), available at http://
www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/trade/legallinformed-compliance-pubs/entone-ipr.cttlen
force-ipr.pdf.
24. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Symposium, Two
Achievements of the Uruguay Round: Putting TRIPS and Dispute Settlement Together, 37
VA. J. INT'L L. 275, 302 (1997) ("[Tlhe cost to member states of enforcing intellectual
property rights is formidable. Monitoring is expensive, the obligation to destroy infringing
materials entails high social costs, and countries with weak civil justice systems must spend
the money to create them. All of this is in addition to the cost of setting up copyright,
trademark, and patent offices and staffing them with trained personnel. Even after these
770 [Vol. 66
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ment to increased public enforcement of intellectual property rights ben-
efit the public? This Article proposes the use of a public interest 25 test to
assist in answering this question.
Given the appeal of the counterfeit medicines narrative, pharmaceuti-
cal companies and other intellectual property-reliant industries, such as
the music and film industries, promulgate the self-serving view that in-
creased public enforcement of intellectual property rights has a salutary
effect, not only for private companies, but for all of us. 2 6 The potential
harm caused by counterfeit drugs enables proponents of strong intellec-
tual property rights to effectively make their case.27 Clearly, counterfeit
medicines may pose some public health risks, but does this harm require
an intellectual property solution?28 Furthermore, should we encourage
government enforcement of private intellectual property rights in order
to protect the public? In particular, should this requirement be enshrined
in international obligations, thereby reducing the ability of nations to in-
dependently make this determination in accordance with their national
goals and values?
Unfortunately, the theory that government enforcement of intellectual
property rights is beneficial to the individual consumer is a result of the
conflation of distinct issues. 29 Wealthy corporations are successfully mak-
ing the case for increased state enforcement of intellectual property rights
by effectively framing the issue of intellectual property enforcement as a
health and safety issue in order to advance their commercial interests. 30
However, the values that inform the positions taken by the intellectual
property industries have been obfuscated.31 This is because increasing
costs are borne, the TRIPS Agreement may present a significant problem to developing
countries.").
25. The "public interest" can be defined as "[s]omething in which the public, the com-
munity at large, has some pecuniary interest, or some interest by which their legal rights or
liabilities are affected." BLACK'S LAW DIcnONARY (6th ed. 1990). There may be a variety
of "public interests" that are affected by a particular provision in an agreement. The salient
interest would need to be identified and used as the gauge for ascertaining the public
benefit.
26. Amy M. Bunker, Deadly Dose: Counterfeit Pharmaceuticals, Intellectual Property
and Human Health, 89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 493, 512-13 (2007); Letter on
Trans-Pac. P'ship Negotiations for Various Indus. Ass'ns to the President of the U.S. (May
8, 2012).
27. Hirschmann, supra note 1 ("Strong IP protection is about not only our economic
progress but also enhancing global public safety. It is not uncommon for enterprises based
overseas to capitalize on the popularity of a product or brand and repackage their untested
products as legitimate. Consumers can easily be duped by these counterfeit goods and,
depending on the product, can also suffer from identity theft or physical harm. IP delivers
safe products to our homes by allowing consumers to identify respected and safe brands.").
28. As there is no ex officio border enforcement of patent rights, this would be limited
to trademarks and copyrights. Ho, supra note 18, at 59-62; Manta, supra note 18, at 469.
29. See Letter on Trans-Pac. P'ship Negotiations from Various Indus. Ass'ns to the
President of the U.S., supra note 26.
30. Even if this is a common business strategy, it doesn't mean it is one that we must
accept.
31. See J. Janewa OseiTutu, Value Divergence in Global Intellectual Property Law, 87
IND. L.J. 1639 (2012); see also R.A. Duff & Stuart P. Green, Introduction: Searching for
Foundations, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAw 1 (R.A. Duff & Stuart
2013]1 771
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protection for trademarks, copyrights, and patents is about enhancing the
ability of intellectual property owners to generate revenue.32 Indeed, the
demands for state enforcement of private intellectual property rights are
not limited to industries where there is some clear health and safety issue,
but extend to a variety of intellectual property goods, ranging from de-
signer bags to films.3 3 This can result in poor policy development and
provisions in international agreements that are neither well-justified nor
appropriate, and which may be simultaneously under-inclusive and over-
inclusive.34
When health and safety interests are used to justify the need for the
government to take an active role in monitoring and enforcing intellec-
tual property rights, such enforcement should be limited to instances
where there are demonstrable health and safety concerns that intersect
with intellectual property interests. On the other hand, if state enforce-
ment of intellectual property rights is for reasons other than health and
safety, these reasons should be evaluated in light of the relevant public
interest. In other words, if government enforcement of intellectual prop-
erty rights is about assisting the entertainment industry or the fashion
industry, rather than diabetic patients, this should also be clear. This will
enable us to make better policy decisions as we evaluate the utility of
relying on public resources to protect the intellectual property interests at
stake. Furthermore, when the public is aware and able to participate in a
transparent dialogue, any laws created will have more legitimacy because
they are more likely to reflect national values.
With a barometer against which to assess government intervention, it
will be more readily apparent that not all counterfeiting should be
painted with a broad brush and that not all intellectual property counter-
feiting warrants government intervention.35 Instead, as this Article ar-
gues, international agreements mandating government enforcement of
intellectual property rights should be limited to instances where there is a
public interest in such enforcement. A test that limits government inter-
vention in monitoring and enforcing intellectual property rights to in-
stances where such intervention is justified by the public interest will help
to ensure that governments do not police intellectual property rights pri-
marily to assist private actors under the guise of promoting the general
welfare of society.36
P. Green eds., 2011) (pointing out that when deciding what should be criminalized, what
makes normative sense partly depends on underlying values).
32. See Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability, 87
TEX. L. REV. 503, 507-10 (2009).
33. See Letter on Trans-Pac. P'Ship Negotiations from various Indus. Ass'ns to the
President of the U.S., supra note 26.
34. See Madhavi Sunder, From Goods to a Good Life: Intellectual Property and
Global Justice 198, 198-99 (2012).
35. See id.
36. LAWRENCE 0. GosIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, Dury, RESTRAINT 92 (2d
ed. 2008) ("The police power represents the state's authority to further the goal of govern-
ment: to promote the general welfare of society.").
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The shift towards greater public enforcement of private intellectual
property rights raises the broader issue of transparency37 in law making.
This Article utilizes the counterfeit medicines discussion as an example of
how employing a turbid rationale for greater intellectual property protec-
tions serves sophisticated and resourceful private interests while poten-
tially harming the public interest. In particular, the ability of individual
nations to craft suitable domestic approaches to intellectual property en-
forcement is quietly being eroded. Transparency in law making leads to
better laws.38 However, there is a lack of transparency with respect to the
negotiating process and the justifications for provisions in international
agreements that require the government to police intellectual property
violations. 39
Drawing on the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS) and a public interest framework, this Article
explores whether, and to what extent, we should accept the need to pro-
tect the public health as a justification for public enforcement of private
intellectual property rights. 40 The justification and rationale for govern-
ment enforcement of intellectual property rights is relevant for a number
of reasons. First, intellectual property enforcement affects the intellectual
property standards that exist in practice because administrative enforce-
ment by governments can result in standards that are effectively higher
than the law requires.41 Second, trends at the international level have an
impact on what happens domestically, and vice versa. 42 Obligations that
nations take on through international agreements become part of domes-
tic law, and domestic laws and policies can serve as the impetus behind
certain provisions in international agreements. 43 Third, the way the dia-
logue is framed impacts the outcome. 44 The narrative affects the language
that is adopted in international agreements and domestic legislation, as
well as the judicial and public understanding of-and reaction to-the
37. Webster's Dictionary defines "transparent" as "easily detected: obvious" or "read-
ily understandable." WEBSTER's DICTIONARY (11th ed. 1984). Transparency is used here in
the ordinary sense of the word.
38. See Diane Dilanni, The Legal Framework of Transparency and Accountability
within the Context of Privatization, LEAGUE WOMEN VOTERS (2011), available at http://
www.wv.org/content/legal-framework-transparency-and-accountability-within-context-pri
vatization.
39. Proposed I. P. Trade Agreement Sparks Alarm Due to Lack of Transparency, CTR.
FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. (2008), http://www.cdt.org/policy/proposed-ip-trade-agree
ment-sparks-alarm-due-lack-transparency.
40. The exceptions to the private enforcement norm are limited to the criminalization
of intellectual property infringement and enforcement of intellectual property rights as
goods enter the country. See Ho, supra note 18, at 59-62; Manta, supra note 18, at 469-70.
In both those instances, the burden of enforcement shifts to the government. See Manta,
supra note 18, at 494.
41. For instance, limitations and exceptions are likely to only be taken into account
after an intellectual property protected good as been detained at the border.
42. See Effects of Domestic Law on International Law, INT'L JUDICIAL MONITOR
(2006), http://www.judicialmonitor.orglarhive0706/generalprinciples.html.
43. See id.
44. Ho, supra note 18, at 3-6.
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ensuing legislative changes. 45
Part II provides a brief background to the problem.46 Part III elabo-
rates on the access to medicines debate and explains how the counterfeit
medicines narrative enables intellectual property owners to respond to
the access to medicines critique.47 Part IV describes the harms caused by
counterfeit medicines, and explains the confusion relating to the use of
the term "counterfeit." 4 8 Part V outlines the role of intellectual property
law as it relates to counterfeiting. 49 Part VI proposes a public interest
framework-specifically, the use of a health and safety test in the context
of counterfeit medicines-as a litmus test for government enforcement of
private intellectual property rights.50 The purpose of such a test is to as-
sist in reframing the discussions of counterfeit medicines and to help clar-
ify when there is a public interest served by requiring national
governments to enforce private intellectual property rights.51 Finally, this
Article employs the proposed test to evaluate some of the current trade-
related intellectual property agreements.
II. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT
The World Trade Organization (WTO) was established in 1994.52 WTO
members had to commit to several agreements in order to be part of the
organization.53 One of these was an agreement that created minimum
standards for intellectual property rights.54 This intellectual property
agreement, TRIPS,5 5 harmonized the global intellectual property stan-
dards in a trade-based regime for the first time.56 TRIPS covers seven
categories of intellectual property, including patents, copyrights, trade-
marks, and geographical indications.57
Better enforcement of intellectual property rights was an important
goal of TRIPS.58 This is because the pre-existing international agree-
45. Id.
46. See infra Part II.
47. See infra Part III.
48. See infra Part IV.
49. See infra Part V.
50. See infra Part VI.
51. Note that the relevant intellectual property rights may be held by foreign corpora-
tions. In fact, it could be against the national interest, depending on whom the intellectual
property owner is, for the government to take on the role of enforcer.
52. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agree-
ment), Apr. 15, 1984, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144.
53. Id. art. 11.2.
54. Id. Annex 1C.
55. TRIPS, supra note 18, art. 4.
56. Id. arts. 1.2, 2, 9, 15, 22, 27.
57. Id.
58. Id. pmbl.
774 [Vol. 66
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ments, such as the Berne Convention 59 and the Paris Convention,60 were
considered inadequate by intellectual property producers, like the United
States and the European Union, because they did not establish substan-
tive norms or have any effective enforcement mechanisms. 61 The WTO
mechanism made enforcement possible through dispute resolution be-
tween countries.62 Under this system, private entities continue to rely on
domestic courts to resolve individual disputes. 63 The WTO dispute reso-
lution process is only available to governments when a WTO member
state is not respecting its WTO obligations.64 Hence, enforcement
through the WTO is distinct from government enforcement of intellectual
property rights at the national level.6 5
Since the establishment of the WTO and the adoption of TRIPS, global
intellectual property law has been criticized as reflecting a "top-down"
approach to intellectual property regulation that is designed to meet the
objectives of wealthy states.66 Numerous scholars have commented on
the current imbalance between protection and access in the global intel-
lectual property regime.67 Some have noted the detrimental impact on
developing countries, most of whom do not have strong intellectual prop-
59. BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS
(BERNE CONVENTION), S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27 (2d Sess. 1986).
60. PARIS CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY (PARIS CON-
VENTION), Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 (as revised at convention done
at Stockholm, July 14, 1967).
61. Marshall A. Leaffer, Protecting United States Intellectual Property Abroad: Toward
a New Multilateralism, 76 IowA L. REV. 273, 293-94 (1991).
62. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
art. 1, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1125.
63. Alberto Alemanno, Private Parties and WTO Dispute Settlement System (Cornell
Law School LL.M. Paper No. 1, 2004), available at http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=ps-clacp.
64. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
art. 1, supra note 62.
65. Id.
66. Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property "From Below": Copyright and Capability for
Education, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 803, 805 (2007) ("Global intellectual property regimes
reflect a top-down approach to global intellectual property regulation, following from the
interests and needs of intellectual property-rich states.").
67. Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman, The Globalization of Private Knowledge
Goods and the Privatization of Global Public Goods, 7 J. INT'L ECON. L. 279, 286 (2004)
("[S]erious questions arise as to the sustainability of the attempt in TRIPS to resolve the
international externality aspects of protecting new knowledge goods. An additional criti-
cism leveled at the emerging IPR system is that the agenda for increasing protection has
been articulated and pushed by rich-country governments effectively representing the com-
mercial interests of a limited set of industries that distribute knowledge goods."); Sisule F.
Musungu & Graham Dutfield, Multilateral Agreements and a TRIPS-Plus World: The
World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) (TRIPS Issues Papers No. 3, 2003), avail-
able at http://www.geneva.quno.info/pdflWIPO(A4) final0304.pdf (noting that the appro-
priateness of the standards contained in the TRIPS Agreement for developing countries
has been seriously questioned, and that the TRIPS standards may be too high for these
countries); Joseph Straus, The Impact of the New World Order on Economic Development:
The Role of Intellectual Property Rights System, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 1
(2006) ("[I]n 1994, TRIPs was at the center of multifaceted criticism, for both developing
and developed countries."); see James Boyle, A Manifesto on WIPO and the Future of
Intellectual Property, 2004 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 9 (2004) (critiquing TRIPS).
2013] 775
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erty industries.68 Others have critiqued the effect of excessive intellectual
property protections on access to intellectual property protected goods
for consumers everywhere. 69 Thus, some scholars suggest models that
take into account the need for accessible and affordable knowledge goods
as a way to respond to the imbalance in the global regime.70 In particular,
the access to medicines critique, which will be discussed in more detail in
the next Part of this Article,71 has been effective in raising public aware-
ness about the possible deleterious effects of excessive intellectual prop-
erty protection. 72
Despite criticisms that the system is tilted too far in favor of the rights
holders, there are still calls for higher intellectual property standards and
68. Carlos M. Correa, Public Health and Patent Legislation in Developing Countries, 3
TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 2 (2001); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Andreas F.
Lowenfeld, supra note 24 ("Now that there is time to be more reflective, we should recog-
nize that as far as developing countries are concerned, the TRIPS Agreement could have a
substantially different impact from the remainder of the WTO agreements. One effect is
obvious: the cost to member states of enforcing intellectual property rights is formidable.
Monitoring is expensive, the obligation to destroy infringing materials entails high social
costs, and countries with weak civil justice systems must spend the money to create
them."); Ruth L. Okediji, The Regulation of Creativity Under the WIPO Internet Treaties,
77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2379, 2405-06 (2009); Jerome H. Reichman & Rochelle Cooper
Dreyfuss, Harmonization Without Consensus: Critical Reflections on Drafting a Substantive
Patent Law Treaty, 57 DUKE L.J. 85, 92 (2007) ("[T]he dynamics of TRIPS and the post-
TRIPS trade agreements teach that even a development-sensitive negotiation process is
likely to produce an instrument that furthers interests of developed countries at the ex-
pense of poorer, less powerful participants."); J.H. Reichman, Comment, Enforcing the
Enforcement Procedures of the TRIPS Agreement, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 335, 349 (1997)
("[Dieveloping countries face real difficulties in overcoming technological lag at socially
acceptable costs, and most of the benefits they may derive from implementing the substan-
tive standards will take time to accrue.").
69. JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE MIND
8-9 (2008) (explaining that intellectual property law does not necessarily work as it should,
but sometimes does the exact opposite, becoming "a kind of perpetual corporate welfare-
restraining the next generation of creators instead of encouraging them"); LAWRENCE LES-
SIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD
(2001); James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public
Domain, 66-SPG LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 37-41 (2003) (describing the expansion of
intellectual property rights); Margaret Chon, Postmodern "Progress": Reconsidering the
Copyright and Patent Power, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 97, 133 (1993) ("For example, many
lesser developed, and even moderately industrialized, countries refused to allow
pharmaceuticals to be patented. The primary reason for this is that pharmaceutical prices
would then rise, impeding consumer access to the benefits of this technology. Western drug
companies view this simply as a denial of fair market access."); Carlos Correa, Internation-
alization of the Patent System and New Technologies, 20 Wis. INT'L L.J. 523, 529-30 (2002)
("Patents on genes restrict the use of what are essentially research tools. Access to these
tools, and hence the progress of science, may be slowed down, particularly in developing
countries and in public research institutions, by the need to obtain multiple licenses and
the escalation of research costs from license fees."); Reichman & Dreyfuss, supra note 68,
at 91-92 ("As the endless controversies surrounding pharmaceutical patents demonstrate,
higher standards of global protection-whatever their incentive effects-also generate se-
vere and unintended distributional consequences for the developing world.").
70. Chon, supra note 66, at 805, 813.
71. See infra Part III.
72. Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property and Human Rights in the Nonmultilateral Era, 64
FLA. L. REV. 1045, 1077-78 (2012).
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increased intellectual property enforcement.73 For instance, there has
been a proliferation of agreements described as "TRIPS-Plus," which are
aimed at further increasing intellectual property protection. While some
commentators have attempted to treat TRIPS standards as a ceiling,74
many more have described TRIPS standards as "minimum" standards for
intellectual property upon which to build.75 Indeed, some WTO members
consider TRIPS enforcement provisions inadequate.76 Hence, there is a
trend described as a "ratcheting up" of intellectual property standards
through various trade mechanisms.77 These range from bilateral invest-
ment treaties78 to bilateral trade agreements79 and multilateral agree-
ments such as the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement8 o and the
ongoing Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement negotiations.81
Arguments in support of increased global intellectual property protec-
tion often refer to the harms caused by counterfeit goods, 2 and counter-
feit medicines in particular.83 For intellectual property owners, having
73. Shanker A. Singham, Symposium, Competition Policy and the Stimulation of Inno-
vation: TRIPS and the Interface Between Competition and Patent Protection in the Pharma-
ceutical Industry, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 363, 363-64 ("Only a strong intellectual property
system can best serve the needs of people around the world. Such a system would promote
greater competition because it would allow market forces to set prices and, as part of a
larger competition policy, would create a better functioning system with significant social
economic gains.").
74. Henning Ruse-Khan & Annette Kur, Enough is Enough-The Notion of Binding
Ceilings in International Intellectual Property Protection, (Max Planck Inst. for Intell. Prop.,
Comp. & Tax Law Research Paper ser. No. 09-01, 2008) available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1326429.
75. J.H. Reichman & David Lange, Symposium, Bargaining Around the TRIPS Agree-
ment: The Case for Ongoing Public-Private Initiatives to Facilitate Worldwide Intellectual
Property Transactions, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 11, 34 (1998) ("Later commentators
have, however, begun a more realistic assessment of these enforcement procedures, which
on closer inspection appear to constitute a set of truly minimum standards of due process
on which future legislation will have to build.").
76. Peter K. Yu, Shaping Chinese Criminal Enforcement Norms Through the TRIPS
Agreement, in CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: A HANDBOOK OF
CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 286, 286-87 (Christophe Geiger ed., 2012).
77. See id.; Deborah Gleeson & Ruth Lopert, Symposium, The High Price of "Free"
Trade: U.S. Trade Agreements and Access to Medicines, 41 J.L. MED. & EmIcs 199, 199
(2013).
78. Bilateral Investment Treaties, OFFICE U.S. TRADE REP., http://www.ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/bilateral-investment-treaties (last visited Oct. 1, 2013).
79. Peter Drahos, BITs and BIPs: Bilateralism in Intellectual Property, 4 J. WORLD
INTELL. PROP. 791, 798 (2001).
80. See ACTA, supra note 6.
81. See TPP, supra note 21.
82. Beverly Earle et al., Combating the New Drug Trade of Counterfeit Goods: A Pro-
posal for New Legal Remedies, 20 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBs. 676, 678-79 (2012)
("Furthermore, the problem is not only a question of lost dollars. While fashion knockoffs
threaten substantial financial losses to the companies that make the originals, there are
greater threats to unknowing consumers than simply a broken zipper. Many counterfeits
are dangerous, such as automobile, airplane, and computer parts, as well as drugs.").
83. Daniel R. Cahoy, Addressing the North-South Divide in Pharmaceutical Counter-
feiting, 8 WAKE FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. 407, 426 (2008) ("All nations realize that wide-
spread availability of dangerous fakes puts their own citizens at risk, at least indirectly.
And it is certain that pharmaceutical companies have a strong interest in preventing the
disruption to the safety and security of the market. Therefore, it is not surprising that a
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governments take on some of the burden of enforcement not only
reduces their costs, but also makes it easier for them to pressure their
own governments to require compliance from foreign governments.84
Thus, there is a trend toward increased intellectual property protection
and enforcement, while at the same time, a strong critique of the detri-
mental impact of intellectual property rights on access to goods, and ac-
cess to medicines in particular.85 As the next Part argues, framing of the
issues is an important part of the dialogue about adequate levels of intel-
lectual property protections.86
III. FRAMING THE DEBATE
A. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES
Those who promote increased intellectual property protections suggest
that it will be in the long-term interest of countries such as India, China,
and Nigeria to protect intellectual property.87 This not only stimulates
their economies, but also protects the health and safety of their citizens.88
However, intellectual property industries faced a tremendous backlash
over the past several years. 89 A number of scholars argue that the mini-
mum intellectual property standards imposed by TRIPS are detrimental
to economically disadvantaged individuals and to the developing world.90
Another observation is that the current regime lacks balance because it is
skewed in favor of the right holders.91 In particular, the global increase of
intellectual property leads to serious concerns about the impact of intel-
lectual property rights on access to life-saving medicines because of the
changes that arose with the implementation of TRIPS.92 For instance, al-
though India did not provide patent protection for pharmaceutical drugs
number of anti-counterfeiting initiatives have emerged with government-industry partner-
ships."); see also Bunker, supra note 26, at 497-99.
84. Peter K. Yu, TRIPS and its Achilles' Heel, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 479, 487-88
(2011).
85. Canoy, supra note 83, at 426-28.
86. See infra Part III.
87. Earle et al., supra note 82, at 732. ("IP will be an engine of growth for both China
and India. It will be in their long-term interest to protect intellectual property. Counterfeit
goods may also affect their citizens' health and safety.").
88. Id.
89. Boyle, supra note 67, at 12 (noting the imbalance created by the expansionist intel-
lectual property agenda).
90. Sunder, supra note 34, at 198-99 ("A one-size-fits-all patent system for drugs in
the developing world is unjust on additional grounds, beyond incentives. Patents that im-
pede access to the poor thwart both local democracy and human development. Nations
must have the freedom to democratically construct patent policies to meet their humanita-
rian needs.").
91. Boyle, supra note 67, at 11 (encouraging a return to the "rational roots of intellec-
tual property rather than an embrace of its recent excesses").
92. Yu, supra note 72, at 1075-76 ("The most widely cited debate concerns the much-
needed access to essential medicines in less developed countries, which was impeded by
the strong protection of patents and clinical trial data . . . This debate has caught the atten-
tion of the WTO, WIPO, WHO, and other international intergovernmental bodies."); see
Peter Drahos, Four Lessons for Developing Countries from the Trade Negotiations Over
Access to Essential Medicines, 28 LIVERPOOL L. REV. 11, 16-17 (2007); Ellen 't Hoen,
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prior to TRIPS, it had a thriving generic drug industry.93 After the estab-
lishment of the WTO and TRIPS, India was required to provide patent
protection for medicines. 94 Indeed, India was one of the first countries to
appear before the WTO for allegedly failing to protect intellectual prop-
erty rights as required under TRIPS.95
Scholars have also noted the potentially detrimental impact of intellec-
tual property rights on the ability of individuals who lack financial re-
sources to access the medications they need. 96 In response to the
argument that life-saving medications would not be available without ad-
equate patent protection, Professor Sunder points out that patents are
"but one among many alternatives for stimulating and rewarding innova-
tion, including prizes and subsidies." 97 She goes on to observe that while
patented drugs save lives, they save "only the lives of those who are will-
ing and able to pay." 98 Thus, according to this critique of the current
model, poor people may not benefit from the kind of innovation that the
current patent system promotes.99
Although patent protection is not necessarily the primary barrier for
access to medicines, patent protection is relevant to access to the extent
that it affects the costs of the medicines.100 Hence, pharmaceutical com-
panies find themselves highly scrutinized for creating obstacles to the
health of those who cannot afford the medicines.101 From this perspec-
TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents, and Access to Essential Medicines: A Long Way from Seat-
tle to Doha, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 27, 27 (2002).
93. Frederick M. Abbott, The WTO Medicines Decision: World Pharmaceutical Trade
and the Protection of Public Health, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 317, 320-321 (2005).
94. See TRIPS, supra note 18, arts. 27, 66.1.
95. WORLD TRADE ORG., WT/DS50/AB/R, INDIA-PARENT PROTECT-ION FOR PHAR-
MACEUTICAL AND AGRICULTURAL CHEMICAL PRODUCTS (1997), available at http://www
.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/tripab.pdf.
96. Amy Kapczynski, The Cost of Price: Why and How to Get Beyond Intellectual
Property Internalism, 59 UCLA L. REv. 970, 996 (2012) ("According to the World Health
Organization, these gains are largely attributable to '[t]he application of knowledge from
health research' to improve, for example, sanitation and access to vaccines. These gains
are, of course, unevenly distributed, and up to ten million lives per year could be saved
simply by providing better access to existing informational goods such as medicines and
vaccines. More research aimed at developing new vaccines and medicines for diseases that
particularly affect the poor in developing countries could save many more lives still.");
Sunder, supra note 34, at 173-78.
97. Sunder, supra note 34, at 175.
98. Id. ("Second, patents do save lives, but primarily only the lives of those who are
willing and able to pay.").
99. Id. at 174 ("Indeed, the evidence is mounting that in crucial ways patents fail to
promote the health of people in the developing world, and in some cases in the developed
world as well."); id. at 178 ("Patents fail to incentivize research that addresses poor peo-
ple's diseases; patents offer little incentive for R&D in poor countries, which lack basic
technological capacity; the patented drugs produced by multinationals are priced out of
reach of the poor; and finally, Big Pharma will not allow generic drug production in the
developing world.").
100. Abbott, supra note 93, at 322-23.
101. Kevin Outterson, Pharmaceutical Arbitrage: Balancing Access and Innovation in
International Prescription Drug Markets, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y, L. & ETHICs 193,
201-02 (2005) ("The social costs of making pharmaceutical knowledge appropriable are
generally three-fold. First, the cumulative effect of these laws allows the innovator to
charge a higher price under monopolistic conditions .. . Second, these higher prices hinder
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tive, intellectual property rights are viewed as impediments to access and
harmful to the interests and lives of those who are affected.102 While most
of the drugs that are considered "essential" by the World Health Organi-
zation are no longer protected by patents, many new and more effective
medications, including medications used to treat non-communicable dis-
ease like asthma and diabetes, may be patented.103 Thus, TRIPS was sig-
nificant in terms on its impact on the global pharmaceutical market.104
Concerns about the effect of increased intellectual property rights on
the public health led to a statement from WTO members about the rela-
tionship between the two.105 In the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and
Public Health, WTO members agreed that intellectual property rights
should not interfere with public health.106 They recognized the need for
intellectual property protection to promote new medicines, but also ac-
knowledged the effect of intellectual property rights on the prices of
medicines. 07 The existence of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Pub-
medical access, directly impacting the health of many low income people globally."); James
T. Gathii, Approaches to Accessing Essential Medicines and the TRIPS Agreement, in IN.
TELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH 393 (Peter K. Yu ed., 2006).
102. But see Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability,
87 TEX. L. REv. 503, 508 (2009) ("In the pharmaceutical industry, firms must invest hun-
dreds of millions of dollars in clinical trials on their drugs before they can be sold to the
public, while their generic rivals are exempted from those requirements and can enter the
market at low cost. Without some way to delay generic competition, therefore, pharmaceu-
tical companies would usually find it impossible to recoup their R&D investments and
would likely invest their money elsewhere. With strong patent protection, however, firms
can expect to enjoy a lengthy monopoly over their drugs, providing them an opportunity to
profit from their investment in R&D. Although the public suffers from high prices
for drugs while they are covered by a patent, most of those drugs probably would not have
been developed without that protection. As a result, it is widely thought that the benefits
of drug patents far outweigh their costs.").
103. Abbott, supra note 93, at 322-23; see also, e.g., Azadeh Momenghalibaf, Indian
Court Limits Frivolous Drug Patenting, Clearing Path to Affordable Medicines, OPEN
Soc'y FOUND., Jan. 3, 2013, available at http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/indi
an-court-limits-frivolous-drug-patenting-clearing-path-affordable-medicines?utmsource=
healthA&utm.medium=email&utm content=text_llnkl&utmcampaign=HealthA_01
1613 (asking "[s]hould pharmaceutical patents-which result in monopolistic pricing of
medicines-apply to any new drug, regardless of how it was made and whether it offers
anything new?" and applauding the Indian Patent Appeal Board for revoking a patent
held by Roche on the basis that it was not novel).
104. Abbott, supra note 93, at 323 ("In considering this issue, the broad scope of the
change that took place on January 1, 2005, must not be overlooked. The mandatory re-
quirement of patent protection for pharmaceutical products is not directed to a narrow
range or class of medicines. It will affect the world pharmaceuticals market generally and
reshape the economy of supply.").
105. See WORLD TRADE ORG., WTIMIN(01)/DEC/2, DECLARATION ON THE TRIPS
AGREEMENT AND PUBLIC HEALTH (DOHA DECLARATION), 41 1.L.M. 755, para. 4 (2002)
("We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent Members from
taking measures to protect public health. Accordingly, while reiterating our commitment
to the TRIPS Agreement, we affirm that the Agreement can and should be interpreted and
implemented in a manner supportive of WTO Members' right to protect public health and,
in particular, to promote access to medicines for all.").
106. Id.
107. Id. 1$ 1-3 ("1. We recognize the gravity of the public health problems afflicting
many developing and least-developed countries, especially those resulting from HIV/
AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics. 2. We stress the need for the WTO
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement)
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lic Health is indicative of the significance of public health concerns about
TRIPS and intellectual property rights.
The need to balance intellectual property protection with other societal
interests is consistent with the constitutional directive of promoting the
"Progress of Science and useful Arts,"' 08 But this does not mean that
intellectual property protection should not be beneficial to society.109 The
challenge, both domestically and internationally, is to balance intellectual
property rights and other valid, and sometimes competing, interests.o10
For instance, although the United States is one of a handful of countries
that is not a party,"1 the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights1 2 recognizes both the right to health and the protec-
tion of intellectual property rights.113
In contrast to the access to medicines scholarship, the counterfeit
medicines dialogue bolsters the argument that better enforcement of
TRIPS and other intellectual property obligations will help control the
circulation of counterfeit medicines.114 Ultimately, the role of intellectual
property in combating the counterfeit medicines trade is limited at
best." 5 Yet, the dangers of counterfeit medicines create a palatable
counter-narrative to the access to medicines critique of intellectual prop-
erty rights.116
to be part of the wider national and international action to address these problems. 3. We
recognize that intellectual property protection is important for the development of new
medicines. We also recognize the concerns about its effects on prices.").
108. Congress has the power "[to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8.
109. See Cooper, supra note 4, at 101.
110. See Abbott, supra note 93, at 357-58.
111. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, STATUS AS AT:
02-09-2013, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=
TREATY&mtdsg no=IV-3&chapter=4&lang=en. The United States signed the ICESCR
on 1977, but has not ratified or acceded to the agreement. Although a handful of other
countries are not parties (i.e., South Africa, Cuba, Belize and a few others), most nations
have acceded to the ICESCR. Id.
112. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3, available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b36cO.html.
113. Article 12(1) of the ICESCR provides: "The States Parties to the present Cove-
nant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of
physical and mental health," and Article 15 (1) recognizes the right of everyone "(b) To
enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications; (c) To benefit from the protec-
tion of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic
production of which he is the author."
114. Cooper, supra note 4, at 102-03 (identifying the use of the Trade Act, 1974 and
increased enforcement of TRIPS obligations as an important part of the solution to the
counterfeit medicines issue.).
115. Bunker, supra note 26.
116. Id.
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B. USING THE COUNTERFEIT MEDICINES NARRATIVE AS A
JUSTIFICATION FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS IN
TRADE AGREEMENTS
There are strong incentives for companies to identify counterfeit
medicines to demonstrate the potential harm caused by intellectual prop-
erty infringement.' 1 7 Since America's competitive edge is in producing
intellectual property-protected goods," 8 intellectual property industries
have an interest in increasing intellectual property standards and ensuring
the enforceability of those standards.119 This trend started with TRIPS.120
Arguably, TRIPS can be cited as an example of regulatory capture.121
However, for the proponents of increased intellectual property standards,
TRIPS did not go far enough, particularly with respect to enforcement
provisions.122
While the harm caused by counterfeit medicines provides a compelling
case for state enforcement of intellectual property rights, the pharmaceu-
tical industry is not the only industry to benefit from increased enforce-
ment.123 A group of more than thirty industry associations wrote to
President Obama to request high standards for intellectual property pro-
tection and enforcement in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotia-
tions.124 The interests represented included the pharmaceutical industry,
the publishing industry, the film industry, the biotechnology industry, the
117. Hirschmann, supra note 1 ("In Virginia alone, IP-intensive industries are responsi-
ble for more than 1.3 million jobs (42 percent all private-sector jobs) and fuel 72 percent of
total exports in the state. As demonstrated by these numbers, the long-term vitality of our
innovative and creative industries relies on a robust system of IP protection. Strong IP
protection is about not only our economic progress but also enhancing global public safety.
It is not uncommon for enterprises based overseas to capitalize on the popularity of a
product or brand and repackage their untested products as legitimate. Consumers can eas-
ily be duped by these counterfeit goods and, depending on the product, can also suffer
from identity theft or physical harm. IP delivers safe products to our homes by allowing
consumers to identify respected and safe brands.").
118. Cooper, supra note 4, at 101-02 ("With the transition to a knowledge-based econ-
omy, the financial future of the United States, and California in particular, very much
depends on the protection of IP abroad, be it royalties for telecom technology, software
from the Silicon Valley, music from Los Angeles, movies from Hollywood, or biotechnol-
ogy in San Diego."). Professor Cooper goes on to describe the anti-piracy efforts as "a
good public relations campaign," but encourages more effective action. Id.
119. Hirschmann, supra note 1 ("In the global economy, IP is one of our most valuable
assets and a key to our competitiveness. Our innovative and creative industries contribute
over 74 percent of our merchandise exports. Without proper IP enforcement, individuals
are less likely to pour their time and resources into pushing the limits of human ingenuity
and developing beneficial new products. This could mean a life-saving medicine going un-
discovered, a great novel going unpublished or a technological advance remaining
unrealized.").
120. See SUsAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF IN-
TELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 121-22 (2003).
121. Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Florence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and
the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167 (1990).
122. Peter K. Yu, The TRIPS Enforcement Dispute, 89 NEB. L. REV. 1046, 1047 (2011).
123. See Letter on Trans-Pac. P'ship Negotiations from Various Indus. Assn's to the
President of the U.S., supra note 26, at 1.
124. Id. at 2-4.
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recording industry, the grocery manufacturers, the software industry, the
clothing industry, and footwear distributors, among others.125
In a separate letter, the Pharmaceutical Researchers and Manufactur-
ers of America (PHRMA) requested that the U.S. Government negotiate
an agreement for strong intellectual property standards, starting with the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and TRIPS standards
as a minimum.126 In addition to financial losses suffered by the pharma-
ceutical industry, PHRMA discussed the role its members play in devel-
oping life-saving medicines to fight diseases globally, as well as the need
to combat counterfeit medicines.127 In stark contrast to the position taken
by PHRMA, thirty-nine civil society groups wrote to TPP negotiators to
express their views on the detrimental impact of the intellectual property
rights on access to medicines.128 In their letter, the civil society groups
expressed concern that "intellectual property measures that may be in-
cluded in an eventual agreement could undermine patients' access to vital
medicines."129 They further recommended that TRIPS standards be
maintained as the maximum standard, and pressed for the implementa-
tion of TRIPS flexibilities. 30
Thus, the civil society groups present the access to medicines concerns,
arguing against increased intellectual property protections.131 In contrast,
advocating for higher intellectual property standards and better enforce-
ment, the pharmaceutical industry recognizes the need to combat coun-
terfeit medicines to discredit the idea that increased intellectual property
standards are harmful to the public health.132 Notably, that the civil soci-
ety organizations that focus on public health issues have not supported
higher intellectual property standards, despite industry arguments that in-
tellectual property contribute to a safer medicine supply.133
125. Id.
126. Letter from Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. to Gloria Blue, Exec. Sec'y of the
Trade Policy Staff Comm., Exec. Office of the President of the U.S.-Trans-Pac. P'ship
Agreement, supra note 5, at 4.
127. Id. at 5.
128. Letter from Australian Fair Trade & Inv. Network et al. to Dep't of Foreign Af-
fairs & Trade of Australia et al. on Safeguarding Access to Medicines in the Trans-Pac.
P'ship Agreement, 1-2 (Feb. 15, 2011), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/TPP-
access-to-medicines-sign-on-letter.pdf ("Nearly two billion people still lack regular access
to medicines in developing countries. Although several important factors contribute to
this, one critical problem is the high price of monopolized medicines. Intellectual property
provisions that go beyond the standard required by the World Trade Organization's Agree-
ment on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (WTO's TRIPS)-so-called
"TRIPS-plus" measures-restrict generic competition, leading to medicine prices that are
unaffordable for most people, and healthcare costs that can restrict health programs' abili-
ties to provide treatment or other services, in both developing and wealthier countries.").
129. Id. at 1.
130. Id. at 2.
131. Id. at 1.
132. Letter from Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. to Gloria Blue, Exec. Sec'y of the
Trade Policy Staff Comm., Exec. Office of the President of the U.S.-Trans-Pac. P'ship
Agreement, supra note 5, at 5.
133. Letter from Australian Fair Trade and Inv. Network et al. to Dep't of Foreign
Affairs & Trade of Australia et al. on Safeguarding Access to Medicines in the Trans-Pac.
P'ship Agreement, supra note 128, at 2.
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In its statements regarding the TPP negotiations, the U.S. government
adopted a stance that corresponds to the industry positions.134 The
United States Trade Representative (USTR) suggests that intellectual
property is not a barrier to access to medicines but, rather, that it en-
hances access to medicines. 135 The USTR frames the discussion by posit-
ing that limited access to medicines is not a result of intellectual property
rights.136 It further asserts that there are many other kinds of barriers to
access, including distribution networks, lack of basic infrastructure, and
the circulation of counterfeit medicines.' 37 In addition, the USTR stresses
that the U.S. Government is finding ways to help improve access to
medicines through development programs and foreign policy
initiatives.' 38
Hence, in line with industry, the government narrative is that intellec-
tual property rights are not the problem but, rather, that intellectual
property is critical to the development and marketing of new
medicines.139 One of the stated aims of the TPP is to utilize border mea-
sures and criminal enforcement as tools to "prevent medicines bearing
counterfeit trademarks from entering TPP markets," thereby protecting
the public health.140 This narrative, which suggests that intellectual prop-
erty is beneficial to the public, serves the interest of all intellectual prop-
erty industries broadly, not just the pharmaceutical industry.141 Once the
case for increased intellectual property enforcement is successfully made
based on the dangers posed by counterfeit medicines, the argument is
extended-often without merit-to other consumer and industrial prod-
ucts.142 Indeed, some commentators have connected counterfeit
medicines not only to petty criminals, but also to terrorist organizations,
thus portraying intellectual property enforcement as a national security
issue.143
However, there are problems with extending the counterfeit medicines
analysis to other goods.'" The strongest case for state enforcement of
134. UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, WHITE PAPER ON TRANS-PACIFIC
PARTNERSHIP TRADE GOALS TO ENHANCE ACCESS TO MEDICINES (TEAM) 1 (2011),
available at http://www.ustr.gov/webfmsend/3059.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 3.
138. Id. at 2, 4.
139. Id. at 3 (stating that it is important to have an "effective, transparent and predict-
able intellectual property system . . . for both manufacturers of innovative and generic
medicines.").
140. Id. at 2.
141. Id.
142. Cooper, supra note 4, at 100 ("But pirated goods pose an equal danger to the
public through fake consumer and industrial products. Piracy is everywhere and affects
everything we do."). Among the examples provided are engine parts, shampoo, baby
formula, and wiring. Id.
143. Id. at 97; Earle et al., supra note 82, at 687 ("However, purses and dresses are only
the tip of the iceberg. Terrorist and other criminals are taking advantage of the lower risks
for counterfeiting not only designer goods, but also pharmaceuticals and parts for com-
puters, cars and airplanes.").
144. Cooper, supra note 4, at 94.
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intellectual property protected goods is with respect to medicines. 145 This
is not necessarily true when it comes to other goods. 146 The film, clothing,
and software industries, for instance, may have business reasons for ad-
vancing strong intellectual property rights in international agreements. 147
Nonetheless, it is unlikely that they can legitimately claim any significant
connection between their intellectual property rights and the public
health or safety, or the public welfare in general, beyond the general
value of the signaling function of trademarks.148 Thus, various intellectual
property industries benefit from treaty provisions requiring increased
government enforcement, even though there may be little to no public
interest justification for the government role.149
Even if there is some additional, demonstrable public benefit, one must
query whether it requires a shift from the norm of requiring a trademark
owner to enforce her rights. It is not clear whether there is a public inter-
est that warrants countries taking on obligations, through international
agreements, to intervene to prosecute crimes related to the misuse of
trademarks on clothing labels or the sale of pirated films.o50 In some in-
stances, consumers will be aware, due to the comparatively low price of a
counterfeit "designer" item, that the goods are counterfeit.15 Addition-
ally, the definition of "counterfeit" medicines is not uniform,152 and the
implications may not be transferable to the use of the term "counterfeit"
in reference to handbags or jeans.' 5 3 A mark may be misapplied, or the
good may be sold without authorization from the right holder, but there
may be no danger to the consumer.154 Moreover, products that promote
the public health, like safe generic drugs, may inadvertently be caught in
145. Id. at 90.
146. Id. at 94.
147. For instance, support for local industries may be a legitimate business reason.
However in the global context, it is not a persuasive reason for other nations. Support for
small businesses that lack resources to pursue litigation in multiple arena may be another
reason a government would seek to enforce private rights.
148. Sandra L. Rierson, Symposium, Pharmaceutical Counterfeiting and the Puzzle of
Remedies, 8 WAKE FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. 433, 434-35 (2008).
149. Id.
150. Earle et al., supra note 82, at 733.
151. Thus while one could argue that misuse of a mark is fraudulent, the consumer may
not be deceived. Cooper, supra note 4, at 95.
152. General Information on Counterfeit Medicines, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www
.who.int/medicines/services/counterfeit/overview/en/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2013) ("The ab-
sence of A universally accepted definition not only makes information exchange between
countries very difficult but it also limits the ability to understand the true extent of the
problem at global level. In order to address this problem the following definition has been
developed by the World Health Organization.").
153. Earle et al., supra note 82, at 682.
154. Id. ("Some authors argue that most counterfeit goods are not a serious problem
and that focus should be on dangerous counterfeit goods like drugs. The argument is that
selling fake luxury goods is a victimless crime. A fake Gucci purse has yet to kill anyone.");
Rierson, supra note 148, at 434 ("In its least virulent form, counterfeiting does not harm
the consumer and, arguably, imposes a relatively minor cost on the trademark holder (par-
ticularly when compared to the remedies available for the harm). If a defendant sells a
cheap copy of a luxury good to the consumer-under circumstances such that the con-
sumer knows exactly what she is buying-the consumer has suffered no injury.").
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the net that is cast for the purpose of capturing intellectual property
infringement.1 55
Interestingly, patents are the intellectual property form that is often
identified as impeding access to medicines.156 However, the state enforce-
ment provisions in TRIPS and ACTA, for instance, address trademarks
and copyright, but not patents.157 Indeed, the copyright and trademark-
dependent industries may have more to gain from these agreements than
patent-reliant industries. 58
C. A PUBLIC INTEREST RATIONALE
As has been discussed, the counterfeit medicines story is one that pro-
vides intellectual property industries a public-interest rationale, rather
than a profit-oriented rationale, to justify demands for the state to take a
greater role in intellectual property enforcement. Notably, demands for
state enforcement of intellectual property rights are not limited to coun-
terfeit medicines or instances where there is a clear public interest at
stake.159
In light of the nature of intellectual property rights, it is important to
have a solid policy rationale for expanding such rights and for shifting
enforcement to governments. As intangible goods, intellectual creations
are "nonexclusive and nonrivalrous."160 In other words, the use of an in-
tangible good by one person does not deprive another from also using the
good. Since it is not diminished by additional uses, intellectual property is
considered a "public good." 161 Further, unlike physical property, the
155. Dispute Settlement: DS409: European Union and a Member State-Seizure of Ge-
neric Drugs in Transit, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/trato-_e/dispu-e/
casese/ds409_e.htm (last updated June 22, 2010).
156. Fredrick M. Abbott, Report, TRIPS in Seattle: The Not-So-Surprising Failure and
the Future of the TRIPS Agenda, 18 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 165, 171 (2000) ("Some develop-
ing Members of the WTO, as well as multilateral institutions like the World Health Organi-
zation . . ., have expressed increasing concern that the wider granting and enforcement of
patents in pharmaceutical products and processes is leading to substantially higher drug
prices, with adverse effects on health care services. Some WTO Members have suggested
that drugs on the WHO's list of essential pharmaceuticals be subject to exclusion from
patent protection or should be entitled to some lesser form of protection than that pres-
ently mandated by the TRIPS Agreement."); Correa, supra note 68, at 6-7 ("The protec-
tion of public health is one of the most pressing issues in developing countries. A large part
of the world population still lacks access to essential drugs .... To deal with this dramatic
situation, an integrated approach to the interrelated issues of national health policy, phar-
maceutical policy, and patent policy is required."); Reichman, supra note 68, at 91-92 ("As
the endless controversies surrounding pharmaceutical patents demonstrate, higher stan-
dards of global protection-whatever their incentive effects-also generate severe and un-
intended distributional consequences for the developing world.").
157. ACTA, supra note 6, at n.2 (With respect civil enforcement, "[a] Party may ex-
clude patents and protection of undisclosed information from the scope of this Section.").
158. Id. arts. 7 & 8.
159. Earle et al., supra note 82, at 733.
160. CHRISTOPHER MAY, A GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTELLECTUAL PROP-
ERTY RIGHTS: THE NEw ENCLOSURES 3-4 (2d ed. 2010); Michael A. Carrier, Cabining
Intellectual Property Through a Property Paradigm, 54 DuKE L.J. 1, 32 (2004).
161. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAw 14 (2003).
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boundaries of abstract objects are exclusively determined by the law. 162
Hence, various intellectual property laws enable the right holder to ex-
clude others, where such exclusion would otherwise not be possible. 163
The right holder is given this time-limited exclusivity in exchange for her
creative contribution to society.164 Thus, intellectual property rights are
part of a social contract-an exchange between the inventor or creator
and the public.165 Some commentators have even suggested that we
should recognize intellectual property privileges, rather than intellectual
property rights,166 and limit the scope of these privileges.167
A public interest test would increase transparency with respect to any
public interest justifications for intellectual property enforcement provi-
sions in international agreements.168 Such a test would also be consistent
with a human-oriented approach to intellectual property, which considers
the social costs of intellectual property protection.169 The "balancing pro-
visions" found in Articles 7 and 8 of TRIPS also recognize that intellec-
tual property rights contemplate the broader public interest and the
interests of the right holder.170 The objectives of TRIPS, as set out in
Article 7, establish that intellectual property rights should promote tech-
nological innovation "in a manner conducive to social and economic wel-
fare, and to a balance of rights and obligations."171 Further, the principles
set out in Article 8 of TRIPS provide that members may adopt measures
"to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest
in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological
development."1 7 2
162. Id. at 93.
163. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Editorial, Scrooge and Intellectual Property Rights, 333 BRIT.
MED. J. 1279, 1279 (2006), available at http://www.bmj.com/content/333/7582/1295.
164. JANICE MUELLER, PATENT LAw 29 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 3d ed. 2009).
165. See, e.g., id. at 30-31. Though this explanation is often used to explain patent law,
it is applicable to other forms of intellectual property as well. Staking Out the Middle
Ground on Intellectual Property: IP Justice Policy Paper, IP JUSTICE.ORG, http://ipjustice
.org/WIPO/IIM3/IPJMiddleGround.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2013).
166. PETER DRAHos, A PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 5 (1996) (character-
izing intellectual property rights as "liberty-intruding privileges of a special kind"); Lea
Shaver, The Right to Science and Culture, 2010 Wis. L. REV. 121, 134 (2009).
167. Drahos, supra note 166, at 200.
168. Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development Divide, 27 CARDozo L.
REV. 2821, 2865 (2006).
169. Id. at 213-14, 223. Professor Drahos has argues that if intellectual property is
viewed as a means to an end intellectual property laws should be developed with a view to
achieving objectives that are based on some moral value. Id.; Chon, supra note 168, at 2823
("This Article attempts to map the challenges raised by these encounters between intellec-
tual property and development. It proposes a normative principle of global intellectual
property-one that is responsive to development paradigms that have moved far beyond
simple utilitarian measures of social welfare. Recent insights from the field of development
economics suggest strongly that intellectual property should include a substantive equality
principle, measuring its welfare-generating outcomes not only by economic growth but also
by distributional effects.").
170. The same is true of the various exceptions to intellectual property rights found in
TRIPS. See TRIPS, supra note 18, arts. 13, 17, 30, & 31.
171. Id. art. 7.
172. Id. art. 8.
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Consistent with Articles 7 and 8 of TRIPS, this Article advocates a
public interest standard for intellectual property obligations in interna-
tional agreements. 173 The first step is to identify the particular public in-
terest at issue.174 Once that interest has been identified, one can assess
the intellectual property obligation in light of the pertinent public inter-
est. 75 This Article does not advocate a health and safety test or a public
benefit test for the acquisition and maintenance of intellectual property
rights. However, if government enforcement of intellectual property
rights is justified, or at least presented as publicly palatable due to some
health or safety benefit to the public,' 76 then this is the standard against
which we should assess whether agreements such as the TPP and ACTA
should oblige governments to take on a greater role in enforcing intellec-
tual property rights.177
D. THE LIMITED ROLE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
It is true that intellectual property rights can help protect the public. 78
Trademarks, copyrights, and patents may be infringed when counterfeit
medicines are sold using the packaging, marks, or drug formulations that
belong to legitimate companies.179 Counterfeit medicines may contain
some of the active ingredients used in the authentic medication, but they
may be used in incorrect proportions or manufactured under poor
conditions.180
Yet, the role of intellectual property enforcement in preventing coun-
terfeit medicines is limited.' 8 ' For instance, one commentator has ob-
served that it is often impossible to differentiate a counterfeit medicine
from the authentic medicine without subjecting the medicine to chemical
analysis.182 Furthermore, anti-counterfeiting technologies have been criti-
173. Id. arts. 7-8.
174. Id. art. 8.
175. If stakeholders, including the consuming public, in the nation adhering to an inter-
national intellectual property agreement see their views reflected in the development of
the government position, they are more likely to view the resulting changes to domestic
law favorably. Cooper, supra note 4, at 102-03. In the case of counterfeit medicines, the
public interest at issue is the public health and the safety of the medicine supply. Id. at 90.
176. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ADMINISTRATION'S WHITE PAPER ON IN-
TELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS 1 (2011), avail-
able at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ip white-paper.pdf.
177. See TEAM, supra note 134.
178. Brian A. Liang, Fade to Black: Importation and Counterfeit Drugs, 32 AM. J. L. &
MED. 279, 312-13 (2006).
179. Id. at 288.
180. Andrew Jack, Bitter Pills, 335 BRIT. MED. J. 1120, 1120 (2007) ("It is said that
around 10% of the global market was fake, rising to 30% in some parts of the developing
world.").
181. See Liang, supra note 178, at 290.
182. Id. (quoting a spokesperson on counterfeiting who "noted that: 'Counterfeit
medicines often appear so like the genuine product that no one, not the best specialist can
tell the genuine packaging from the counterfeit. And no one, not the best specialist can tell
the genuine product from the counterfeit unless the product is subjected to chemical analy-
sis. The result is that everyone, poor, ignorant, rich and smart, all are at risk from counter-
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cized as tracking "cardboard, not product." 83 In other words, the pack-
aging may be genuine, even though the product is not.184 Nonetheless,
intellectual property industries refer to the danger of counterfeit goods to
justify increased policing and enforcement of intellectual property
rights. 85
Characterizing intellectual property as a tool in the fight against coun-
terfeit medicines bolsters the trend towards increased intellectual prop-
erty protections and enforcement in international agreements. 8 6 This
potentially positive role for intellectual property is essential for the intel-
lectual property industries, as they contend with the criticisms about the
detrimental effect of intellectual property rights on access to medicines
and knowledge.187 However, it is not obvious that improved global en-
forcement of intellectual property rights is an appropriate or effective so-
lution to the counterfeit medicines problem. 88 Governments may take
on intellectual property enforcement obligations under the guise of
health and safety without actually improving health or safety.189 Counter-
feiters may use authentic packaging for fake drugs, or legal generic drugs
may be incorrectly identified as violating intellectual property rights.190
Safe generic drugs may not reach the public because they allegedly in-
fringe intellectual property rights.191 In addition, state enforcement may
capture intellectual property infringement related to the misuse of de-
signer labels on wristwatches, for example, when there is no pressing pub-
lic health or safety interest and no clear reason for the government to
take on enforcement of the rights.192
There should be transparent guidelines for determining whether an in-
tellectual property interest coincides with a broader public interest, like
protecting the rights of the trademark owner.193 The particular public in-
terest at stake may change, depending on the nature of the goods.194 In
the case of counterfeit medicines, the question is whether better intellec-
tual property enforcement can be justified on the basis of improving the
feit or sub-standard products . . . .' This situation truly makes counterfeit drug production
and sale the perfect crime.").
183. Id. at 305 (quoting testimony to the House Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade,
and Consumer Protection).
184. Id. (quoting testimony to the House Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and
Consumer Protection that "It is not unusual to find genuine product in counterfeit packag-
ing and counterfeit product in genuine packaging. In the United States and the European
Union, the two largest pharmaceutical markets in the world, repackaging is legal; thus ...
state of the art secure devices can end up in the trash or worse, in the hands of a counter-
feiter, while genuine product is legally distributed in packaging with no security features.").
185. Cooper, supra note 4, at 90-91.
186. See TEAM, supra note 134, at 2.
187. Chon, supra note 168, at 2826-27.
188. See id. at 2822-23.
189. Amir Attaran et al., Why and How to Make an International Crime of Medicine
Counterfeiting, 9 J. IN'L CRIM. JUST. 325, 338 (2011).
190. General Information on Counterfeit Medicines, supra note 152.
191. See infra Parts IV.B & V (discussing the seizure of drugs in transit).
192. Rierson, supra note 148.
193. Chon, supra note 168, at 2865.
194. Rierson, supra note 148, at 434-35.
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public health. 195 Thus, it makes sense to begin by assessing such claims
against a health and safety standard.196 The next Part elaborates on why
all counterfeit goods should not be painted with a broad brush.197
IV. COUNTERFEIT MEDICINES
A. THREATS To HEALTH AND SAFETY
For many people, downloading films from the Internet without paying
for them may seem innocent.198 This is likely because no one is physically
harmed by the downloads, although the movie industry and the actors
may suffer financial losses.199 Counterfeit medicines, on the other hand,
provide a powerful case for government enforcement of intellectual prop-
erty rights.200 Criminals who traffic in cocaine or other substances may
also engage in the counterfeit medicine trade.201 And, like cocaine, coun-
terfeit medicines can kill.20 2 Intellectual property advocates and members
of the pharmaceutical industry credit poor global enforcement of intellec-
tual property rights as part of the problem. 203
The sale and trafficking of counterfeit medicines is dangerous, and the
effects can be devastating. 204 For instance, the thirty-six year-old owner
195. Id.
196. See id. at 435.
197. See infra Part IV.
198. Rierson, supra note 148, at 434.
199. This Article does not endorse illegal downloading of films, but simply stresses that
harms differ depending on the nature of the goods in question.
200. Jack, supra note 180, at 1120.
201. Earle et al., supra note 82, at 681 ("Why sell heroin if you can sell fake brakes?
The profits are higher and the risks are lower.").
202. Attaran et al., supra note 189, at 332 ("Ultimately, we do not know precisely how
much damage is done by this criminal arsenal of tricks. The regulatory systems to detect
counterfeit are weak and the available estimates are imperfect, such as one much-cited
estimate that counterfeits kill 700,000 people annually.").
203. See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 4, at 90 ("Across the globe, people are poisoned by
counterfeit medicines, billions of dollars are diverted from economies, and criminal gangs
and terrorists are enriched due to lackluster criminal enforcement of intellectual property
(IP) rights."); Maria Nelson et al., Counterfeit Pharmaceuticals: A Worldwide Problem, 96
TRADEMARK REP. 1068, 1071-72 (2006) (linking weak intellectual property enforcement to
counterfeit medicines and arguing that counterfeit medicines harm not only pharmaceuti-
cal companies but also society as a whole).
204. See, e.g., Peter Aldhous, News Feature, Murder by Medicine, NATURE, Mar. 9,
2005, at 133, available at http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v434/n7030/full/434132a
.html (describing deaths from fake anti-malarial drugs); Amir Attaran et al., supra note
189, at 329 ("For example, a recent forensic study documented the movement of counter-
feit medicines from China to nearby Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar (Burma), Thailand and
Vietnam. The products in this study were all fakes of artesunate-a highly effective cure
for life-threatening falciparum malaria."); Brian A. Liang, Symposium, A Dose of Reality:
Promoting Access to Pharmaceuticals, 8 WAKE FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. 301, 305-06
(2008) ("For example, patients who are prescribed drugs such as growth hormone for HIV
treatment and other diseases have received dangerous substitutes including insulin and
steroids, expertly labeled to be indistinguishable from the true drug. . . . Counterfeiters
have used bacteria-laced water, but in addition they have employed brick dust, rat poison,
boric acid, colored dye, floor wax, powdered cement and toxic yellow road paint. . . . An-
other outrageous case involves counterfeit cystic fibrosis inhalers for pediatric patients that
were filled with bacterially contaminated materials. This substance, masquerading as an
authentic medication, was then sprayed directly in the children's vulnerable lungs.").
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of Pacific Orient International was convicted for selling counterfeit
medicines. 205 Pacific Orient International sold drugs that appeared to be
legitimate medications produced by established and reliable pharmaceuti-
cal companies like Pfizer and Eli Lily.2 0 6 However, these counterfeit
drugs did not have the required level of effective ingredients. 207 In this
case, the drugs in question were for the treatment of serious illnesses like
schizophrenia and cancer.208 The individuals relying on these medications
had no reason to believe that there was anything wrong with their medi-
cations, particularly since they looked authentic. 209 Unfortunately, this
kind of crime occurs more commonly than one might expect.210 Hence,
there is an apparent need for tighter controls on the drug supply, both in
the United States and elsewhere. 211
Professor Liang outlines three ways in which counterfeit medicines can
be harmful.212 First, a counterfeit drug might contain incorrect or ineffec-
tive medicine, or drug may have expired. 213 Second, a counterfeit drug's
incorrect concentration might be the result of dilution.214 Third, a coun-
terfeit drug may have either no active ingredients or harmful ingredients
such as powdered cement, boric acid, or toxic road paint. 215 Frequently,
counterfeit drugs with some active ingredient are mixed with some au-
thentic materials, in an effort to evade detection when samples are se-
lected for testing.216
Although medicines in the United States are generally quite safe, coun-
terfeit medicines that enter the country compromise the safety of the
205. News Release, U.S. Attorney's Office, Internet Distributor Convicted of Traffick-
ing in Fake Cancer Drugs (July 7, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/crimina/cyber-
crime/press-releases/2008/xuConvict.pdf; see United States v. Xu, 599 F.3d 452 (5th Cir.
2010), amended by No. 4:07-CR-00362-001 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 23, 2010).
206. News Release, supra note 205.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. See Ashworth v. Albers Med., Inc., 395 F. Supp. 2d 395, 398-99 (S.D.W. Va. 2005)
(mem. op.) (Patient asserted claim against manufacturer, pharmacy, and others for injuries
sustained after consuming counterfeit Lipitor tablets.); Fagan v. AmerisourceBergen
Corp., 356 F. Supp. 2d 198, 204 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (Patient sought to recover damages for
injuries after "suffer[ing] from continued anemia and excruciating side effects" from taking
counterfeit Epogen injections.).
211. Attaran et al., supra note 189, at 331 ("Even the United States, which has probably
the world's best-regulated pharmaceutical market, experienced an 800% increase in re-
ported instances of counterfeit drugs between 2000 and 2006. Essentially, no part of the
world is exempt."); Stephanie Feldman Aleonga, Green Medicine: Using Lessons from Tort
Law and Environmental Law to Hold Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Authorized Dis-
tributors Liable for Injuries Caused by Counterfeit Drugs, 69 U. Prrr. L. REV. 245, 247
(2007) ("The drug distribution system in the United States is porous and vulnerable.");
Liang, supra note 204, at 310 ("Counterfeit drugs in the U.S. are not new. Although the
domestic drug supply has been relatively closed to counterfeits, the system has been infil-
trated in the past by numerous breaks in the supply chain.").
212. Liang, supra note 178, at 283-85.
213. Id. at 283-84.
214. Id. at 284.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 285. This is referred to as "salting." Id.
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medical supply, and create health risks for the public. 217 The U.S. Gov-
ernment has also identified piracy and counterfeiting in the online envi-
ronment as a threat to health and safety.218 Further, counterfeit drugs
and other counterfeit goods may be circulating in significant numbers in
developing countries.219 This risk to developing nations is noteworthy,
particularly because developing country advocates have critiqued the im-
pact of TRIPS and other intellectual property agreements on their social
and economic development, 220 including the ability of their nationals to
access the life-saving medicines they need. 221 This raises the question of
whether developing countries will benefit or suffer from increased intel-
lectual property rights and enforcement. 222 On one hand, stricter intellec-
tual property enforcement could help, although to a limited extent,
ensure that the medicine supply is safer for everyone.223 On the other
hand, increased intellectual property rights and enforcement of those
rights may limit access to medicines needed to maintain health and access
to relevant knowledge and information, as was the case when generic
drugs were seized while transiting through Holland.224 The perception of
the harm caused by weak intellectual property rights makes the counter-
feit medicines narrative such a powerful one for the intellectual property
industries.225
Ultimately, the challenge of effectively controlling the counterfeit
medicines trade may most appropriately lie with national health regula-
tory bodies and criminal authorities, perhaps working in concert with
their global counterparts. 226 Due to the complexity of trafficking in coun-
terfeit medicines, the solution is complex and must be tackled from multi-
ple angles. 227 Clearly, fake or counterfeit medicines can be harmful. 228
But what role should intellectual property laws play in regulating the
safety of the medicine supply? Some commentators, such as Professor
Liang, suggest that intellectual property rights make counterfeiting profit-
217. Jack,supra note 180, at 1120 ("It is said that around 10% of the global market was
fake, rising to 30% in some parts of the developing world.").
218. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 176.
219. Jack, supra note 180, at 1120.
220. Chon, supra note 168, at 2823 ("Intellectual property, while purporting to heed the
issues of development, often runs rough-shod over the central concerns of development.").
221. Id.
222. Id. at 2866.
223. Cahoy, supra note 83, at 421 ("When a counterfeit mimics the identity of a legiti-
mate company, there is obviously a strong incentive to take legal action to stop the confu-
sion. Certainly this can take the form of a trademark infringement action if source
confusion is at issue. . . . The specter of litigation may cause some counterfeiters to refrain
from operating with a particular drug.").
224. See infra Part V.
225. Manta, supra note 18, at 484.
226. See, e.g., Attaran et al., supra note 189, at 333 (arguing in favor of an international
crime for medicine counterfeiting).
227. See id. at 328-29.
228. See id. at 326.
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able. 2 2 9 Whether intellectual property is part of the problem or the solu-
tion, the challenge of combatting the trade in counterfeit medicines is
exacerbated by the lack of clarity regarding the meaning of the term
"counterfeit medicine." 230
B. WHAT IS A COUNTERFEIT MEDICINE?
It is difficult to argue with the need to maintain a safe medicine supply.
However, the word "counterfeit" is often used in ways that can cause
confusion about products that are harmful versus those that are not
harmful.231 The discussion also lends itself to the slippery slope of treat-
ing all "counterfeit" goods as harmful, due to the fact that some counter-
feit goods are extremely dangerous. 232 Often, it is not clear what precisely
is meant by "counterfeit medicine," which contributes to the confusion in
discussions about counterfeit goods.233
For instance, generic versions of patented products have been mis-
characterized as counterfeit drugs. 234 A generic drug and a counterfeit
drug are not the same thing, although they have been confused for one
another.235 Dutch officials seized generic drugs that were in transit from
India on the basis that they infringed intellectual property rights.236 This
seizure led to a request for consultations under the WTO dispute settle-
ment mechanism.237 India manufactured the generic medicines, which
were not patented in India, and shipped them to a third country where
there was also no patent, via Holland.238 Although the medicines only
had to transit through Holland, and were not intended for the Dutch mar-
ket, the Dutch authorities seized the goods in question.239 These goods
were not made illegally, nor were these fake or poor quality medicines. 240
Rather, these were authentic generic medicines, made consistent with In-
dian law and India's obligations under the WTO agreements, including
TRIPS.241 However, these legally made goods were treated as intellectual
property-infringing goods under Dutch law.2 4 2 This is just one example of
229. Liang, supra note 178, at 322 ("However, the potential importation of, and manu-
facture and sale of fake drugs exists because of high prices; and high prices exist in part due
to high development costs and lack of price controls.").
230. General Information on Counterfeit Medicines, supra note 152.
231. Rierson, supra note 148, at 434.
232. See id.
233. General Information on Counterfeit Medicines, supra note 152.
234. See WORLD TRADE ORG., WT/DS408/1, G/L/921, IP/D/28, EUROPEAN UNION AND
A MEMBER STATE-SEIZURE OF GENERAL DRUGS IN TRANSIT: REQUEST FOR CONSULTA-
TIONS BY INDIA (2010), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/januaryl
tradoc_147464.pdf.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. FREDERICK M. ABBOTr ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN AN
INTEGRATED WORLD ECONOMY 270 (2d ed. 2011).
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the confusion surrounding the meaning of the term "counterfeit" and the
potential impact of state enforcement of intellectual property rights.243
It is, therefore, important to clarify what is meant by the term "coun-
terfeit medicine." A counterfeit medicine can be defined in a variety of
ways. An item can be described as a "counterfeit" if it is an illegal copy
that one intends to pass off as the original. 244 According to the World
Health Organization (WHO):
A counterfeit medicine is one which is deliberately and fraudulently
mislabeled with respect to identity and/or source. Counterfeiting can
apply to both branded and generic products and counterfeit products
may include products with the correct ingredients or with the wrong
ingredients, without active ingredients, with insufficient active ingre-
dients or with fake packaging.245
In other words, a "counterfeit medicine," as defined by WHO, is one
that leads the consumer to believe it is from a legitimate source.246 It may
also be a product that is not medicinal or effective, even though the con-
sumer thinks he or she is purchasing medicine. 247
Importantly, the WHO definition is distinct from the definition of
counterfeit found in TRIPS, which limits counterfeiting to the misuse of a
trademark, and defines "counterfeit" as:
[A]ny goods, including packaging, bearing without authorization a
trademark which is identical to the trademark validly registered in
respect of such goods, or which cannot be distinguished in its essen-
tial aspects from such a trademark, and which thereby infringes the
rights of the owner of the trademark in question under the law of the
country of importation.248
For the purpose of criminal trademark prosecution in the United
States, a "counterfeit drug" is defined as:
[a] drug which, or the container or labeling of which, without author-
ization, bears the trademark, trade name, or other identifying mark,
imprint, or device, or any likeness thereof, of a drug manufacturer,
processor, packer, or distributor other than the person or persons
who in fact manufactured, processed, packed, or distributed such
drug and which thereby falsely purports or is represented to be the
product of, or to have been packed or distributed by, such other drug
manufacturer, processor, packer, or distributor.249
Thus, in the intellectual property context, counterfeiting is primarily
243. General Information on Counterfeit Medicines, supra note 152.
244. Counterfeit is defined as ". . . to copy or imitate without authority or right, and
with a view to deceive or defraud, by passing the copy or thing forged for that which is
original or genuine." BLACK's LAw DICflONARY (6th ed. 1990).
245. General Information on Counterfeit Medicines, supra note 152.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. TRIPS, supra note 18, art. 51 n.14.
249. 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(2) (2006).
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about the misuse of trademarks.250 Copyright infringement, for example,
is commonly referred to as "piracy." 251 The term "counterfeit medicine,"
as used in the health context, is broader than the way "counterfeit" is
normally understood when referring to intellectual property.252 A "coun-
terfeit medicine," according to the WHO definition, is primarily about
the substantive product, although it can also encompass misuse of the
trademark associated with the product.253 An intellectual property focus
on the misuse of a trademark is distinct from a focus on the substantive
product, and could lead to very different treatment of the goods in ques-
tion.2 5 4 The substantive goods are important, from a health perspective,
because they could be dangerous.255 From an intellectual property per-
spective, the concern is on the use of the mark without authorization,
which does not necessarily mean that the goods are dangerous. 256 In-
stead, this means that the trademark was used without permission of the
right holder or, perhaps, that the packaging used was confusingly similar
to that used by another producer. 257 Of course, because trademarks per-
form a signaling function, there may be instances where the consumer
relies on the trademark as an indicator of quality and safety.258 Thus,
intellectual property interests and health concerns may intersect. How-
ever, this is not always the case.
Some commentators suggest that the public health meaning of counter-
feit and the intellectual property meaning of counterfeit should be more
clearly distinguished.259 Professor Attaran and his co-authors propose
adopting a definition "solely to capture threats to public health and
safety." 260 They suggest taking the WHO definition as a "starting point"
for differentiating the public health concerns from the intellectual prop-
erty interests.261 A definition focused on public health and safety will
help clarify the discussion and avoid confusing intellectual property inter-
ests with health and safety concerns.262
The same can be said for using health and safety as a barometer against
which to measure the propriety of government enforcement of intellec-
tual property rights, at least with respect to counterfeit goods. 263 When
there is potentially a serious impact on the public health or safety, the
250. TRIPS, supra note 18, art. 51 n.14.
251. Id.
252. General Information on Counterfeit Medicines, supra note 152.
253. Id.
254. Carrier, supra note 160, at 19.
255. Liang, supra note 178, at 288.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Carrier, supra note 160, at 18.
259. Attaran et al., supra note 189, at 339 ("[T]here should be more assiduous separa-
tion between the public health meaning of 'counterfeit' (i.e. non-therapeutic) and the intel-
lectual property meaning of 'counterfeit' (i.e. infringing).").
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. See id.
263. Id.
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government may be justified in taking on the enforcement of intellectual
property rights.264 In contrast, when there is no overriding health or
safety concern, some other rationale for government enforcement must
be found. Certainly, public health and safety is not the only basis upon
which to justify state enforcement of intellectual property rights.265 How-
ever, it is the most pertinent to the use of intellectual property laws to
curtail the distribution of counterfeit medicines. 266
For the purposes of this Article, the broader WHO definition will be
employed when referring to counterfeit medicines, because that is how
the term "counterfeit" is commonly used in the health context. Taking
counterfeit medicines as fake drugs and/or medicines that misuse trade-
marks, copyrights, or patents, the next inquiry concerns the appropriate
role for intellectual property law. This requires a brief consideration of
the extant intellectual property rules.
V. ENFORCEMENT
Intellectual property rights are private rights, as is explicitly recognized
in TRIPS.267 Generally speaking, intellectual property owners are re-
sponsible for monitoring and enforcing rights.268 When the owner of a
trademark or a copyright suspects infringement, the right holder has judi-
cial recourse.269 In other words, the right holder must commence litiga-
tion to enforce the right against infringement.270 However, trade
agreements like ACTA require states to alter domestic laws such that the
responsibility is increasingly shifted to the government and to the public
purse.271
When the infringement amounts to a crime, or when there are border
measures in place, the right holder can rely on the state to take action on
its behalf.272 Although copyright infringement and trademark infringe-
ment have been criminalized, the same is not true for patent infringement
in the United States.273 Thus, the discussion of state enforcement here is
limited to copyright and trademark. 274 With respect to counterfeiting,
trademark is the primary form of intellectual property right that tends to
264. For instance, if consumers trust that a particular trademark is an indicator of qual-
ity and safety, the intellectual property interests would coincide with the health and safety
concerns.
265. See Rierson, supra note 148.
266. See id.
267. The TRIPS Preamble recognizes "that intellectual property rights are private
rights." TRIPS, supra note 18.
268. Lanham Act, Pub. L. No. 79-489, § 32, 60 Stat. 427, 437-38 (1946) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2012)).
269. See id. (providing for a civil action for the misuse of a trademark); see also Lanham
Act § 43 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2012)).
270. Lanham Act § 32.
271. ACTA, supra note 6.
272. Manta, supra note 18.
273. Id.
274. See id. at 469, 472.
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be implicated.275
A. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY BORDER MEASURES
The Department of Homeland Security and its agencies report govern-
mental seizures of allegedly infringing goods at the border, which led to
691 arrests and 334 prosecutions in 2012.276 Goods bearing a trademark
similar to any trademark that is recorded with the U.S. Customs and Bor-
der Patrol (Customs) and that is likely to cause confusion can be detained
at the border.277 Trademark and copyright owners can register their rights
with Customs, and can then report alleged infringements activity through
an online service or by calling a 1-800 number.278 Customs will then seize
the goodS279 and notify the intellectual property owner.280 If Customs
seizes goods that infringe a copyright, the goods must be destroyed.281 If
the goods bear a counterfeit trademark, the goods will be destroyed un-
less it is determined that the goods do not pose a health risk and the
trademark owner gives his consent to the goods being released after the
infringing mark is removed.282
B. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CRIMES
It is not the purpose of this Article to argue that existing intellectual
property crimes should be repealed or that intellectual property infringe-
275. See id.
276. U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., OFFICE OF INT'L TRADE, INTELLECTUAL PROP-
ERTY RIGHTS: FISCAL YEAR 2012 SEIZURE STATISTICS, available at http://www.cbp.gov/
linkhandle/cgov/newsroom/publications/trade/fy_2012_finalstats.ctt/fy_2012_finalstats
.pdf.
277. 19 C.F.R. § 133.22(b) (2013) ("Any articles of foreign or domestic manufacture
imported into the United States bearing a mark or name copying or simulating a recorded
mark or name shall be denied entry and subject to detention.").
278. e-Allegations Submission, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, http://apps/cbp
.gov/eallegations/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2013); U.S. Government Agencies: U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (CBP), STOPFAKES.Gov, http://www.stopfakes.gov/us-gov-agencies/cbp
(last visited Oct. 1, 2013) ("Holders of registered trademarks and copyrights concerned
about imports or exports of infringing goods [can] record their trademarks and copyrights
with U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). Patents may not be recorded with CBP
for border enforcement protection; however, patent owners may be entitled to exclusion of
infringing imports into the United States under section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930.").
279. Any article "imported into the United States bearing a counterfeit trademark shall
be seized and, in the absence of the written consent of the trademark owner, forfeited for
violation of the customs laws." 19 C.F.R. § 133.21 (2000); U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT.,
supra note 276, at 2 ("In Fiscal Year (FY) 2012, DHS and its agencies, CBP and ICE,
remained vigilant in their commitment to protect American consumers from intellectual
property theft as well as enforce the rights of intellectual property rights holders by ex-
panding their efforts to seize infringing goods, leading to 691 arrests, 423 indictments and
334 prosecutions.").
280. 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c) (requiring that the right holder be given notice).
281. 19 C.F.R. § 133.52(b) (2013) ("Articles forfeited for violation of the copyright laws
shall be destroyed.").
282. 19 C.F.R. § 133.52(c) ("Merchandise forfeited for violation of the trademark laws
shall be destroyed, unless it is determined that the merchandise is not unsafe or a hazard to
health and the Commissioner of Customs or his designee has the written consent of the
U.S. trademark owner, in which case the Commissioner of Customs or his designee may
dispose of the merchandise, after obliteration of the trademark, where feasible.").
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ment should never be criminalized. 283 Rather, this Article focuses on in-
ternational agreements mandating state enforcement of intellectual
property rights, whether through creating more intellectual property
crimes or border enforcement. 284 The content of these agreements is rele-
vant to national intellectual property laws and policies because the agree-
ments require government participants to make changes to domestic
law.285
There are some fairly serious penalties for criminal infringement of in-
tellectual property. 286 Under current U.S. trademark law, an individual or
entity may be subject to criminal sanctions for intentionally trafficking or
attempting to traffic in counterfeit goods or services, including counter-
feit drugs.287 For purposes of criminal trademark infringement, a counter-
feit drug is one that is mislabeled such that it falsely purports to originate
from a particular manufacturer. 288 This captures not only reproductions
of a mark, but also misuse of a genuine mark with fake drugs. The poten-
tial penalties for first-time offenders who traffick in counterfeit goods or
services include a maximum prison term of ten years, or a maximum fine
of two million dollars for individuals and five million dollars for enti-
ties.289 Repeat offenders may be imprisoned for up to twenty years or
fined up to five million dollars for individuals, and fifteen million dollars
for entities. 290 Trafficking in counterfeit labels 291 affixed to or accompa-
nying copyrighted works has also been criminalized. 292 Trafficking in
counterfeit labels carries a maximum term of five years of imprisonment
and a fine of up to two hundred and fifty thousand dollars for individuals
and five hundred thousand dollars for entities. 293 For these offences, the
penalty may be either imprisonment, a fine, or both. 2 9 4
Intellectual property offenses that result in physical harm or death are
punished more harshly than those that do not.295 Even for first-time of-
fenders, the penalties are more severe for trafficking in counterfeit goods
or services that lead to serious bodily injury or death.296 The maximum
term of imprisonment for an individual increases from ten years to twenty
283. The question as to whether or not intellectual property offenses should be
criminalized at all is an interesting question, but it is beyond the scope of this Article.
284. TRIPS, supra note 18, art. 61.
285. See id.
286. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2320(b) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
287. 18 U.S.C. § 2320(a) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
288. Id. § 2320(f)(6). The term "counterfeit drug" means a drug, as defined by Section
201 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, that uses a counterfeit mark on or in
connection with the drug. Id.
289. Id. § 2320(b)(1).
290. Id. § 2320(b).
291. "Counterfeit label" is defined as an "identifying label or container that appears to
be genuine, but is not." Id. § 2318(b)(1).
292. Id. § 2318(a)(1)(A).
293. Id. § 2318.
294. Id.
295. Id. § 2320.
296. Id. § 2320(b).
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years, when serious bodily injuries are sustained.297 If the trafficking in
counterfeit goods or services results in the death of an individual, the
maximum penalty is life in prison.298 For an entity that causes serious
bodily injury or death, the maximum fine is fifteen million dollars. 299
Thus, the current law distinguishes between intellectual property crimes
resulting in tangible harm to human life or health from those that do
not.300
Unlike trademark and copyright infringement, patent infringement has
not been criminalized in the United States.301 Nonetheless, it is an of-
fense to forge patent letters. 302 It is also an offense to counterfeit or
falsely imitate a patentee's mark, or to falsely claim that an item is pat-
ented or that the patent is pending.303 There are also criminal copyright
offenses for the commercial distribution of infringing works.304 A viola-
tion of the Copyright Act30 5 can lead to a maximum term of imprison-
ment of ten years, 306 depending on whether it is a repeat offense and on
the value of the copyrighted work involved.307
C. FOOD & DRUG OFFENSES
The penalties for intellectual property infringement are harsher than
those for violations of the laws regulating the food and drug supply.308
Counterfeit drug crimes can be prosecuted under the Federal Food, Drug
& Cosmetics Act (FD&C Act).309 Counterfeit medicine cases that are
prosecuted under the FD&C Act are misdemeanors, unless there was in-
tent to defraud or mislead.310 The maximum sentence is three years in
prison.31' Trafficking in counterfeit medicines is therefore not considered
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Patent infringement has, however, been criminalized elsewhere. See Manta, supra
note 18, at 471.
302. 18 U.S.C. § 497 (2006).
303. 35 U.S.C. § 292(a) (2006 & Supp. V 2011) ("Whoever, without the consent of the
patentee, marks upon, or affixes to, or uses in advertising in connection with anything
made, used, offered for sale, or sold by such person within the United States, or imported
by the person into the United States, the name or any imitation of the name of the paten-
tee, the patent number, or the words "patent," "patentee," or the like, with the intent of
counterfeiting or imitating the mark of the patentee, or of deceiving the public and induc-
ing them to believe that the thing was made, offered for sale, sold, or imported into the
United States by or with the consent of the patentee ... shall be fined not more than $500
for every such offense. Only the United States may sue for the penalty authorized by this
subsection.").
304. Manta, supra note 18.
305. 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2012).
306. 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
307. 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2012) (The severity of the sanctions differ depending on sev-
eral factors including the nature of infringing act committed under § 506(a)(1)(A),
(a)(1)(B), or (a)(1)(C)).
308. 18 U.S.C. § 2319.
309. 21 U.S.C. § 333 (2006).
310. Id.
311. Id.
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a crime carrying severe consequences. 312 Some commentators suggest
that the penalties for trafficking in counterfeit goods are so inadequate
that the activity even appeals to persons not normally expected to engage
in criminal activity. 313 It is no surprise, therefore, that there are proposals
to strengthen criminal penalties relating to counterfeit medicines in the
United States.314 In comparison to the three-year sentence for food and
drug crimes, the maximum penalty for selling goods bearing counterfeit
trademarks is ten years in prison.315
Given that the protection of health and safety is not one of the pur-
poses of intellectual property law, perhaps the penalties related to viola-
tions of the FD&C Act should be increased to deter and punish health-
related crimes. 316 However, intellectual property laws can and should be
used to counter medicine-related infringement, to the extent that intellec-
tual property is a relevant and effective tool.31 7 Both private industries
and the government seem to view intellectual property laws as a tool in
the fight against counterfeit medicines. 318 For instance, the Obama Ad-
ministration recommended increasing the sentencing guidelines for "in-
tellectual property offenses that risk death or serious bodily injury and
for those offenses involving counterfeit drugs (even when those offenses
do not present that risk)."319 As discussed throughout this Article, intel-
lectual property appears to play a role in enhancing public health and
welfare. However, the importance of intellectual property laws in this
context is much more limited than intellectual property industries sug-
gest. The next Part of this Article will examine the extent to which the
utility of intellectual property law in protecting the public justifies provi-
sions in international agreements that mandate government monitoring
and enforcement of intellectual property rights.
VI. PUBLIC INTEREST AS THE GUIDING PRINCIPLE
This Article posits that government enforcement of private intangible
rights is justifiable when there is harm or risk of harm to the public. In
this context, harm means human cost, such as the loss of life or risk to
health. This is not to suggest that we should promote the misuse of intel-
312. Id.; see also, Liang, supra note 178, at 292 ("Allen Valentine, the mastermind of the
UK counterfeit ring, who had been convicted on 14 previous occasions on charges of medi-
cation fraud, only received 5.5 years imprisonment-and the sentence was due to his copy-
right infringement, not his threat to public health.").
313. Earle et al, supra note 82, at 679 ("When even housewives consider selling coun-
terfeit products a good job, one must conclude that the penalties are not a sufficient deter-
rent compared to the rewards.").
314. EXEc. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, JOINT STRATEGIC PLAN ON INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT 19 (2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/
files/omb/assets/intellectualproperty/intellectualproperty strategic plan.pdf.
315. 18 U.S.C. § 2320.
316. An increase in FD&C Act penalties has been recommended. See EXEC. OFFICE OF
THE PRESIDENT, supra note 10.
317. Nelson et al., supra note 203, at 1078-80.
318. Id.
319. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 176, at 2.
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lectual property or that intellectual property rights should not be
respected. Rather, the argument here is that provisions in international
agreements that will require governments to enforce private intangible
rights should be limited to situations where such intervention is necessary
to protect the public interest. In particular, with respect to counterfeit
medicines, this should be limited to instances where the government
seeks to protect the public from harm by protecting the public interest in
health and safety.32 0 This public interest framework is consistent not only
with objectives and principles of TRIPS,321 but also with aspects of inter-
national human rights law.322 Furthermore, in so limiting state enforce-
ment of private intangible rights, it will become apparent that such
instances are relatively limited.
Public health is clearly a matter that falls within the purview of the
government,323 while intellectual property rights are private rights that
are generally enforced privately. 324 In intellectual property law, as with
civil litigation in general, the role of the state is primarily limited to pro-
viding a system of private enforcement that intellectual property owners
can use to enforce their rights.325 Bear in mind that health and safety
considerations are not relevant when it comes to acquiring, maintaining,
or enforcing intellectual property rights. 326 Copyright protection arises
automatically upon the creation of the work.327 Trademarks can be ac-
320. OseiTutu, supra note 31, at 1652-83.
321. TRIPS, supra note 18, art. 7 (requiring a balancing of interests); id. art. 8 (recog-
nizing flexibility to protect the public health).
322. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 112,
art. 12.
323. Andrew Ashworth & Lucia Zedner, Just Prevention: Preventive Rationales and the
Limits of the Criminal Law in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 279, 281
(R.A. Duff & Stuart Greens eds., 2011) ("Given the problems of identifying limits, let us
focus first on what may fairly be taken to be the core. Any account of the state's obliga-
tions towards citizens ought surely to include the obligation to take all reasonable measure
to protect people from death or serious physical harm. This suggests the provision of public
health services regulation of activities such as driving to ensure maximum coordination as
well as safety; and the prevent of physical harm through a mixture of regulation (health
and safety, for example), private law (a system of tort law), and criminal law."); Lawrence
0. Gostin, Health of the People: The Highest Law?, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHics 509, 510 (2004).
("The word public in public health has two overlapping meanings-one that refers to the
entity that takes primary responsibility for the public's health, and another that indicates
who has a legitimate expectation of receiving the benefits. The government has primary
responsibility for the public's health. The government is the public entity that acts on be-
half of the people and gains its legitimacy through a political process. A characteristic form
of "public" or state action occurs when a democratically elected government exercises
powers or duties to protect or promote the population's health.").
324. See generally Copyright Act of 1976 (Copyright Act), Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat.
2541 (codified as amended in 17 U.S.C.); U.S. Patent Act of 1952 (Patent Act), Pub. L. No.
82-593, 66 Stat. 781 (codified as amended in 35 U.S.C.); Lanham Act, Pub. L. No. 79-489.
325. See Copyright Act § 504; Patent Act § 271(a); Lanham Act § 43.
326. See Patent Act §H 101-105; Lanham Act § 1051; Copyright Act § 201.
327. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) ("A work is 'created' when it is fixed in a copy or pho-
norecord for the first time; where a work is prepared over a period of time, the portion of it
that has been fixed at any particular time constitutes the work as of that time, and where
the work has been prepared in different versions, each version constitutes a separate
work."); BERNE CONVENTION, supra note 59; TRIPS, supra note 18.
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quired and maintained as long as the mark is used in association with
goods and services. 328
Governments may protect the public through the use of private law,
regulation of activities, or through the use of criminal law,3 2 9 including
the police power. Professor Gostin defines the police power as:
The inherent authority of the state (and, through delegation, local
government) to enact laws and promulgate regulations to protect,
preserve, and promote the health, safety, morals, and general welfare
of the people. To achieve these communal benefits, the state retains
the power to restrict, within federal and state constitutional limits,
private interests-including . . . economic interests in freedom to
contract and uses of property. 330
Thus, state enforcement of intellectual property rights can be justified,
to some extent, on the basis of protecting the public health.331 However,
where there is no public health or safety benefit, some other justification
for an active government role must be found. For instance, state govern-
ments3 3 2 may choose to use its police power to protect and preserve the
general welfare of the people, which is very broad and can encompass
many different things.333 Unless it can be shown that some public interest
would be promoted by a shift to government enforcement of private in-
tellectual property rights, private rights holders should be left to monitor
and enforce their rights. 3 3 4 This would be an appropriate limitation of the
use of the power of the state to police private interests.335
328. 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2012).
329. Ashworth, supra note 323, at 281 ("Any account of the state's obligations towards
citizens ought surely to include the obligation to take all reasonable measure to protect
people from death or serious physical harm. This suggests the provision of public health
services regulation of activities such as driving to ensure maximum coordination as well as
safety; and the prevent of physical harm through a mixture of regulation (health and safety,
for example), private law (a system of tort law), and criminal law. Resort to the criminal
law, rather than another possible approach, is a decision that therefore needs to be justified
independently.").
330. GOSTIN, supra note 36.
331. This is not to suggest that the right to health is more important than other human
rights norms, like the right to culture. For instance, Article 25 of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights refers to the right to "a standard of living adequate for the health and
well-being of himself and his family ... including medical care. . . ". Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (UDHR) art. 25, Dec. 10, 1948, 19 U.S.T. 6228, 999 U.N.T.S. 302. Article
27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognizes the right of everyone to
"freely participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts, and to share in
scientific advancement and its benefits." Id. at art. 27.
332. Because the Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution reserves for the
states all powers not explicitly granted to them by the Constitution, the federal govern-
ment, which is the government that enters into international agreements, does not have a
general police power but must resort to other constitutional authority (such as the com-
merce clause) for its actions with regard to health and safety. U.S. CONsT. amend. X; see
Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2578 (2012).
333. GosnIN, supra note 36.
334. Earle et al., supra note 82, at 682.
335. GosnIN, supra note 36, at 91 ("The 'police power' is the most famous expression of
the natural authority of sovereign governments to regulate private interests for the public
good.").
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A. HIERARCHY OF RIGHTS, GOODS, OR HARMS?
If counterfeiting involves luxury goods, such as designer handbags,
rather than medicines, there is less justification for the state to be in-
volved in monitoring and enforcing pertinent intellectual property
rights.336 Instead, it would be appropriate for the right holder to take the
primary role in enforcing the rights. 33 7 IS this creating a hierarchy of
goods? Yes, but only with respect to government enforcement, and justifi-
ably so. Intellectual property-protected products do not have to be
treated identically. 338 Harm, insofar as there is a financial loss suffered by
the individual right holder, is insufficient to warrant the use of public re-
sources to enforce private intangible rights absent some broader public
interest.339 Recall that the right holder has the primary responsibility for
monitoring and enforcing his or her rights. 340 For instance, if a trademark
holder fails to police and enforce his mark, the mark may eventually lose
its distinctiveness, and the right holder may lose his claim to the mark.341
Moreover, if the public, through taxes paid for law enforcement, ab-
sorbs the cost of protecting the right, there should be some relevance to
the public welfare beyond the general desire to protect and promote in-
novation or efficient business transactions. Given the nature of intellec-
tual property rights, as discussed in Part VI.B, 3 4 2 the innovation goal is
already promoted by the existence of intellectual property protection.343
Furthermore, despite the rhetoric about counterfeit goods and organized
crime,344 it is inadequate to justify government intervention in monitoring
and enforcing private intellectual property rights based on the hypothesis
that counterfeiting luxury goods is attractive to those who make counter-
336. Earle et al., supra note 82.
337. Id. at 731.
338. See Patricia L. Judd, Towards a TRIPS Truce, 32 MICH. J. INT'L L. 613, 617 (2011)
("[B]reathing new life into TRIPS flexibilities helps rights holders by allowing judgments
of compliance to take into account not just geography, but also the market for the particu-
lar product in question. For instance, the impact of seemingly non-commercial systems
facilitating peer-to-peer trading of copyrighted files over the internet may need to be as-
sessed differently than the impact of a rogue textbook printer.").
339. This is not to suggest that the government may never have an interest in prosecut-
ing financial harms, like securities fraud, for instance.
340. Copyright Act § 504; Patent Act § 271(a); Lanham Act § 43.
341. 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (2006) (A mark may be cancelled if "the registered mark be-
comes the generic name for the goods or services, or a portion thereof, for which it is
registered.").
342. See infra Part VI.B.
343. Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution of the United States authorizes Congress to
"promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8.
344. See ACTA, pmbl. ("Noting further that the proliferation of counterfeit and pirated
goods, as well as of services that distribute infringing material, undermines legitimate trade
and sustainable development of the world economy, causes significant financial losses for
right holders and for legitimate businesses, and, in some cases, provides a source of reve-
nue for organized crime and otherwise poses risks to the public.").
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feit medicines or industrial goods and to terrorist organizations. 345 First, it
is not the purpose of intellectual property law to control the activities of
terrorist organizations. Second, any such terrorist-related organized crime
can be addressed through legislation specifically directed toward that
purpose.346
Creating a hierarchy of products and a hierarchy of harms is distinct
from creating a hierarchy of rights as between the different forms of intel-
lectual property.347 This differentiation is with respect to government ac-
tion, depending on the nature and scope of the harm vis-d-vis the
public. 3 4 8 If the harm does not amount to a significant risk to the public,
such as risk of death or serious illness, the case for government monitor-
ing and enforcement of intellectual property rights is not satisfied. 349 Fur-
thermore, not all counterfeit goods are harmful to the public.3 50 For
instance, under the current law, when Customs detains counterfeit goods
at the border, the goods may be released after the infringing mark has
been removed, absent all public health risks.35'
B. UNDERLYING VALUES
Policy decisions are informed by underlying values, even if the values
are not explicitly stated.352 International agreements that aim to enforce
intellectual property rights place value on these rights and on their en-
forcement.353 Some intellectual property industries are seeking state en-
forcement of intellectual property-protected goods that do not have a
health and safety impact. 354 However, such justifications should be
clearly distinguished from any health and safety arguments.355 This is im-
portant in the intellectual property context because the other public wel-
fare justifications may be far less persuasive than assertions about
protecting public health and safety.356 For example, the loss of tax reve-
nue or profit for a handful of intellectual property owners offers a less
345. Earle et al., supra note 82, at 687 ("Terrorists and other criminals are taking advan-
tage of the lower risks for counterfeiting not only designer good, but also pharmaceuticals
and parts for computers, cars, and airplanes.").
346. For instance, 18 U.S.C. § 2339(c) prohibits activities that finance terrorism, with
penalties ranging from 10 to 20 years imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339(c) (2006). Pro-
viding material support to terrorists or to terrorist organization can lead to a term of im-
prisonment ranging from 15 years to life in prison. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339 (a), (b) (2006).
347. See Earle et al., supra note 82, at 682.
348. See id.
349. See id.
350. See id.
351. 19 CFR §133.52 (2013) ("Merchandise forfeited for violation of the trademark
laws shall be destroyed, unless it is determined that the merchandise is not unsafe or a
hazard to health and the Commissioner of Customs or his designee has the written consent
of the U.S. trademark owner .... ).
352. As I have argued elsewhere, underlying values inform the development of suitable
national policies. See OseiTutu, supra note 31, at 1657.
353. See TRIPS pmbl. & arts. 7 & 8.
354. See infra Part III.B (discussing TPP negotiations).
355. See Earle et al., supra note 82, at 682.
356. See id.
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compelling justification for government enforcement of intellectual prop-
erty rights than the potential health risk associated with counterfeit
medicines.357
Even the view that counterfeit goods are harmful to society, and that
this justifies high levels of intellectual property protection and enforce-
ment, reflects a particular perception of copying, which is open to de-
bate.35 8 For instance, it is not entirely clear that copyright piracy or
trademark counterfeiting have a deleterious effect on public morals or on
the general welfare of society.359 To the contrary, some commentators
argue that excessively strong intellectual property rights are more detri-
mental to society than weak intellectual property rights.3 60 Even if one
were to take the position that all copying is bad, the question remains as
to whether differing counterfeit goods should be treated homogeneously.
The answer to this question requires another value judgment. But, what
criteria is used to answer this question? One view might be that intellec-
tual property infringement should never be tolerated, and that govern-
ment intervention is always justifiable.361 Another view is that some
counterfeiting has more serious implications for society than other kinds
of counterfeiting, and that government intervention is not always
required. 362
The criteria used to ascertain when the governments must, in accor-
dance with their international obligations, monitor and enforce intellec-
tual property rights should be clear.3 6 3 As this Article suggests, when it
comes to government intervention, the benefit for the public generated
by reducing the risk of harm should be the primary criterion used to de-
termine whether government enforcement of intellectual property rights
is warranted.3 6 This would militate in favor of some government role
with respect to counterfeit medicines, but not necessarily the same role
with respect to music piracy, for instance. 365
Consistent with the idea of differential treatment depending on the
harm caused, the Obama Administration's recommended legislative
changes reflect a policy decision to treat crimes related to counterfeit
357. See id.
358. See Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, Do As I Say (Not As I Did): Putative Intellectual
Property Lessons for Emerging Economies from the Not So Long Past of the Developed
Nations, 64 SMU L. REv. 923, 973 (2011).
359. For instance, the United States had a history of piracy in the early years of the
country's development. See Peter Drahos, The Universality of Intellectual Property Rights:
Origins and Development 5 (1999), available at http://www.wipo.intledocs/mdocs/tk/en/
wipo-unhchr-ip-pnl98/wipounhchr ip-pnl_98_lpdf.
360. Outterson, supra note 101, at 201-02 ("The social costs of making pharmaceutical
knowledge appropriable are generally three-fold. First, the cumulative effect of these laws
allows the innovator to charge a higher price under monopolistic conditions . . . Second,
these higher prices hinder medical access, directly impacting the health of many low in-
come people globally.").
361. See OseiTutu, supra note 31, at 1657.
362. See id.
363. See id.
364. See id.
365. Rierson, supra note 148, at 450-56.
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medicines and intellectual property crimes that risk serious injury or
death more harshly than those that do not.3 6 6 In its White Paper, the Ad-
ministration recommended increasing the penalty for economic espio-
nage and for drug offenses under the FD&C Act, "particularly for
counterfeit drug offenses." 367 There is an emphasis on harsher penalties
for counterfeit drug offenses in particular.368 This differential treatment
makes sense in light of the potentially serious impact of such offenses. 369
An implicit value guides these legislative proposals, and appears to relate
to the level of economic harm or the potential harm to human health or
life. 370
Thus, when the harm is less significant, insofar as there is little to no
risk to human health and safety, governments should refrain from taking
on the role of enforcer of intellectual property rights. But, if a Gucci bag
is stolen-as opposed to a mark being misused-the crime of theft, which
is prohibited by our criminal law, was committed. 371 Why should we treat
intellectual property differently? Intellectual property is different be-
cause it is non-rivalrous and, though often discussed as property, it does
not have the same characteristics as tangible property.372 The effect of
use of intangible goods without permission is distinct from the impact of
use of tangible property.373 If a thief steals a designer purse from its
owner, the owner is deprived of its use. In addition, the unauthorized use
of intangible goods lacks the element of physical violence that tends to
accompany the theft of personal property.3 7 4
366. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 176, at 2 ("Increase the U.S. Sen-
tencing Guideline range for intellectual property offences that risk death or serious bodily
injury and for those offenses involving counterfeit drugs (even when those offenses do not
present that risk) .....
367. Id. at 1.
368. Id. at 2 ("Require importers and manufacturers to notify the Food and Drug Ad-
ministration (FDA) and other relevant agencies when they discover counterfeit drugs or
medical devices, including the known potential health risks associated with those products;
Provide for civil and criminal forfeiture under the FFDCA, particularly for counterfeit
drug offenses; . . . increase the statutory maxima for drug offenses under the FFDCA,
particularly for counterfeit drug offenses; and 6 . . . , recommend that the U.S. Sentencing
Commission increase the U.S. Sentencing Guideline range for intellectual property of-
fenses that risk death and serious bodily injury, and for those offenses involving counterfeit
drugs (even when those offenses do not present that risk).").
369. Id.
370. Although there may be no problem with the criteria that inform the government's
policy decisions, and clear set of criteria has the benefit of transparency.
371. See Manta, supra note 18, at 473-80.
372. F.H. LAWSON AND BERNARD RUDDEN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 38 (3d ed. 2002)
("[Intellectual property] confers the right to require everyone not to do something, and to
make him or her pay compensation if they do. In that way, intellectual property rights are
similar to the rights of a landowner against trespassers. But of course they are very dissimi-
lar in that there need be no tangible object: they protect the products, not of nature but of
the human mind . . .. [Intellectual property rights] are really monopolies, protected by the
law for a limited, and in some cases, unlimited, time.").
373. Manta, supra note 18, at 471 (discussing the differences between the harms that
result from property crimes versus IP infringement).
374. Id. at 475 (citing the Model Penal Code § 223 cmt. 2(a)(1980), "That history begins
with a concern for crimes of violence - in the present context, the taking of property by
force from the possession of another, i.e. robbery. The criminal law then expanded, by
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When it comes to misuse of a designer label, the designer is deprived of
revenue to which he would otherwise be entitled.375 However, unlike the
physical purse, a trademark can be used multiple times by multiple peo-
ple, and several individuals can download the same piece of music. 3 7 6
This is done without depriving anyone of the ability to use the mark or
enjoy the music. 3 7 7 When this is done with the permission of the right
holder, there is no objection. However, when a mark is used without per-
mission, or when music is downloaded without permission, we object.378
The harm relates to the lack of permission from and remuneration to the
right holder.379 However, use by one-whether legal or illegal-does not
affect the ability of another to make use of the same intellectual property.
Ultimately, it remains the primary responsibility of the individual prop-
erty owner, not the government, to monitor the use of its intellectual
property, and to enforce its rights against infringing parties.380 Arguably,
there is a justifiable exception to this rule when there is some greater
public interest that warrants government intervention. When discussing
intellectual property enforcement in relation to counterfeit medicines, the
impact on public health and safety is the relevant societal good against
which to gauge the need to resort to the state's police power.38'
Even if intellectual property laws can help curb the trade in counterfeit
medicines, they are only a very limited part of the solution to a complex
problem. 3 8 2 Arguably, state enforcement of intellectual property has little
to do with protecting the public. Existing international intellectual prop-
erty agreements contain enforcement provisions for all intellectual prop-
erty rights; not just for counterfeit medicine-related crimes or public
safety-related offenses.38 3 New agreements seek to build on what TRIPS
established. 384 However, these agreements generally aim to limit the flex-
means of the ancient quasi-criminal writ of trespass, to cover all taking of another's prop-
erty from his possession without his consent, even though no force was used.").
375. See Sam Cocks, The Hoods Who Move the Goods: An Examination of the Boom-
ing International Trade in Counterfeit Goods and an Assessment of the American Efforts to
Curtail its Proliferation, 17 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENTr. L.J. 501, 503-04
(2007).
376. See James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the
Public Domain, 66-SPG LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 41 (2003).
377. Id.
378. Stephen E. Siwek, THE TRUE COST OF SOUND RECORDING PIRACY TO THE U.S.
ECONOMY (Inst. for Policy Innovation Ctr. for Tech. Policy Report No. 188 2007), available
at http://www.ipi.org/docLib/20120515_SoundRecordingPiracy.pdf ("The true cost of sound
recording piracy far exceeds its impact on U.S. producers and distributors of sound record-
ings. Piracy harms not only the owners of intellectual property but also U.S. consumers and
taxpayers.").
379. See Cocks, supra note 375.
380. IpVenture, Inc. v. ProStar Computer, Inc., 503 F.3d 1324, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
("Only the entity or entities that own or control all substantial rights in a patent can en-
force rights controlled by that patent.").
381. See OseiTutu, supra note 31, at 1657.
382. WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 14.
383. TRIPS, supra note 18, art. 41.
384. ACTA, supra note 6.
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ibility that was built into TRIPS.3 8 5 The next Part of this Article turns to a
more specific consideration of the enforcement provisions of some of the
international intellectual property agreements.
VII. INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT
PROVISIONS & GOALS
A. TRIPS & TRIPS PLUS
TRIPS requires countries to implement enforcement procedures that
will prevent and deter infringement. 386 Importantly, however, the precise
nature of these procedures is left to the WTO member states to deter-
mine.38 7 In addition, WTO member states must have criminal penalties
for willful trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a commercial
scale.3 8 8 This includes a requirement to allow the authorities to com-
mence investigations or legal action on their own initiative. 389 These pro-
visions in TRIPS mean that "in appropriate cases," member states must
enable government authorities to enforce trademark and copyrights-at
least where it appears that there may be infringement on a commercial
scale.390
Nonetheless, some allege that the enforcement provisions of TRIPS
have no teeth. 391 In particular, the meaning of infringement on a "com-
mercial scale" is not always clear, as the WTO dispute between China
385. Cynthia M. Ho, A New World Order for Addressing Patent Rights and Public
Health, 82 CHI-KENT L. REv. 1469, 1496 (2007) ("Whereas TRIPS allowed countries flexi-
bility in defining the terms of patentability to meet their individual needs, subsequent
FTAs infringe on that flexibility.").
386. TRIPS, supra note 18, art. 41.1. ("Members shall ensure that enforcement proce-
dures as specified in this Part are available under their law so as to permit effective action
against any act of infringement of intellectual property rights covered by this Agreement,
including expeditious remedies to prevent infringements and remedies which constitute a
deterrent to further infringements. These procedures shall be applied in such a manner as
to avoid the creation of barriers to legitimate trade and to provide for safeguards against
their abuse.").
387. See id. art. 1 ("Members shall give effect to the provisions of this Agreement.
Members may, but shall not be obliged to, implement in their law more extensive protec-
tion than is required by this Agreement, provided that such protection does not contravene
the provisions of this Agreement. Members shall be free to determine the appropriate
method of implementing the provisions of this Agreement within their own legal system
and practice.").
388. Id. art. 61.
389. Id.
390. WORLD TRADE ORG., WT/DS362/7, CHINA-MEASuREs AFFECTING THE PRO-
TECTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGirrs: REQUEST FOR THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF A PANEL BY THE UNITED STATES (2007), available at http://www.wto
.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/362rde.pdf.
391. Peter K. Yu, The TRIPS Enforcement Dispute, 89 NEB. L. REV. 1046, 1049 (2010).
For a contrary view, see Laurence R. Helfer, Human Rights and Intellectual Property: Con-
flict or Coexistence?, 5 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 47, 54 (2003) ("[U]nlike earlier intellec-
tual property agreements, TRIPS has teeth."); J.H. Reichman & David Lange, Bargaining
Around the TRIPS Agreement: The Case for Ongoing Public-Private Initiatives to Facilitate
Worldwide Intellectual Property Transactions, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 11, 35 (1998)
("The enforcement provisions are crafted as broad legal standards, rather than as narrow
rules, and their inherent ambiguity will make it harder for mediators or dispute-settlement
panels to pin down clear-cut violations of international law.").
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and the United States illustrates.392 In addition, under TRIPS, member
states retain the discretion to determine when state enforcement of intel-
lectual property rights is appropriate. 393
Since TRIPS, many bilateral trade agreements include provisions that
increase intellectual property protections and omit the provisions that
were included in TRIPS to protect the public interest or allow nations
greater national control.394 WTO members agreed to allow each nation to
determine which principle of exhaustion to apply, and when right holders
may use intellectual property rights to control the circulation of goods.3 95
However, some of the post-TRIPS bilateral agreements reject interna-
tional exhaustion and therefore prevent parallel importation.396 This
means that lower-priced authentic products, which are intended for a
market other than the one in which they are being sold, may be consid-
ered infringing goods.397
B. THE ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT
The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) attempts to ad-
dress some of the perceived weaknesses of TRIPS with respect to en-
forcement. 398 TRIPS requires members to enable a right holder to apply
to have goods held by customs authorities when the right holder has rea-
son to believe that infringing goods are about to be imported. 399 ACTA
expands on TRIPS enforcement obligations in various ways. 400 For in-
stance, under ACTA, member states must have measures for competent
authorities to act upon their own initiative to investigate or commence
criminal prosecutions for willful trademark counterfeiting or copyright in-
fringement on a commercial scale.4 0 In contrast to TRIPS, the ACTA
obligation is not tempered by the language, "in appropriate cases." 402
This modifying language provides WTO members with a significant level
of flexibility in implementation.403 By comparison, ACTA parties under-
take to have their competent authorities (the government) monitor the
392. WORLD TRADE ORG., supra note 390.
393. TRIPS, supra note 18, art. 1.
394. Ho, supra note 385, at 1502.
395. TRIPS, supra note 18, art. 6.
396. Ho, supra note 385, at 1501 ("Some of these agreements prohibit developing coun-
tries from importing patented drugs from countries that sell them at the lowest price; that
is, they prohibit parallel importation and reject the principle of exhaustion. For example,
the US-Singapore and US-Morocco Free Trade Agreements limit parallel importation by
requiring member countries to provide patent holders with the means to block importation
of patented drugs if it violates a distribution agreement.").
397. Id.
398. See ACTA, supra note 6.
399. See TRIPS, supra note 18, art. 51.
400. ACTA, supra note 6, pmbl.
401. See id. arts. 23 & 26. Article 23.2 provides: "Each Party shall provide for criminal
procedures and penalties to be applied in cases of willful importation and domestic use, in
the course of trade and on a commercial scale, of labels or packaging." See id. art. 23.
402. See id.
403. TRIPS, supra note 18, art. 61.
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misuse of trademarks and copyrights and prosecute the offenders. 404 In
addition, ACTA mandates criminal enforcement of trademark and copy-
right infringement that occurs on a commercial scale.405
However, proponents of increased intellectual property enforcement
face the need to justify directing public resources towards enforce-
ment.406 Both TRIPS and ACTA provide that governments are under no
obligation to redirect resources to the enforcement of intellectual prop-
erty rights.407 For instance, Article 2.2 of ACTA provides that "[njothing
in [the] Agreement creates any obligation with respect to the distribution
of resources as between enforcement of intellectual property rights and
enforcement of law in general." 408 Article 4.15 of TRIPS contains similar
language. 409
In addition, those seeking to maximize intellectual property protections
attempt to illustrate the value in promoting their objective by characteriz-
ing the benefit as belonging not only to private corporations, but to the
broader public as well.4 1 0 Indeed, trademark counterfeiting or copyright
infringement on a commercial scale may be something that a government
would like to prosecute. 411 Alternatively, it may be that prosecuting intel-
lectual property infringers is not a governmental priority,412 or that it
would only become a government priority in instances where the public
would be harmed by the infringement.413
Measuring the ACTA provisions against a health and safety standard, it
is apparent that the provisions are overreaching. 414 Misuse of a trade-
mark "on a commercial scale" may capture all kinds of activities that
have little to no impact on the public health.415 For instance, the misuse
of trademarks on clothing labels may have little to no negative health or
safety impact.416 The same is true for copyright infringement occurring
404. ACTA, supra note 6, arts. 23, 26.
405. ACTA, supra note 6, art. 23.1 ("Each Party shall provide for criminal procedures
and penalties to be applied at least in cases of willful trademark counterfeiting or copyright
or related rights piracy on a commercial scale.").
406. Sean M. Flynn et al., The U.S. Proposal for an Intellectual Property Chapter in the
TransPacific Partnership Agreement, 28 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 105, 185 (2012).
407. See TRIPS, supra note 18, art. 41.5; ACTA supra note 6, at art. 2.2.
408. ACTA, supra note 6, art. 2.2.
409. TRIPS, supra note 18, art. 41.5 ("It is understood that this Part does not create any
obligation to put in place a judicial system for the enforcement of intellectual property
rights distinct from that for the enforcement of law in general, nor does it affect the capac-
ity of Members to enforce their law in general. Nothing in this Part creates any obligation
with respect to the distribution of resources as between enforcement of intellectual prop-
erty rights and the enforcement of law in general.").
410. Id. art. 41.5.
411. TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP, Draft: Intellectual Property Rights Chapter (Feb. 10,
2011) (unpublished), available at http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/tpp-10feb20l1-us-
text-ipr-chapter.pdf.
412. Gibbons, supra note 358.
413. See OseiTutu, supra note 31, at 1657.
414. See id. at 1668-69.
415. WORLD TRADE ORG., supra note 390.
416. Rierson, supra note 148, at 434.
810 [Vol. 66
Private Rights for the Public Good?
through music piracy.417 Even utilizing a general public benefit standard,
ACTA's state enforcement provisions go too far from an intellectual
property perspective, and they are completely inadequate from a health
perspective. 418 Counterfeit medicines that do not involve trademark or
copyright infringement "on a commercial scale" will not be impacted.419
For instance, if the scope of the operation is relatively small, it may not
meet the "on a commercial scale" requirement. 420 Finally, even if pro-
moting social order is asserted as the public good arising from state-en-
forced intellectual property, intellectual property theft does not lead to
the same kind of social chaos as the theft of real property, due to its non-
rivalrous nature. 421 If there is no other public interest that is served by
the adoption of these enforcement provisions, then it may be that the
primary purpose is to protect certain industries.
C. THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) provisions proposed by the
United States in the leaked 2011 version, require all parties to make pat-
ents available for new uses of existing products.422 This proposed change
is particularly relevant for the pharmaceutical industry, because it allows
for the extension of the patent term on the basis of the new use.423 The
difficulty with new use patents is that they facilitate potential "evergreen-
ing" of patents, or ongoing extensions of what is supposed to be a time-
limited right without requiring much inventiveness. 424 The U.S. proposal
also effectively eliminates the current exception to patentability under
Article 27.3 of TRIPS.425 The United States proposed that all parties
make patents available for plants and animals, and for diagnostic, thera-
417. See id.
418. Margot Kaminski, The Origins and Potential Impact of the Anti-Counterfeiting
Trade Agreement, 34 YALE J. INT'L L. 247, 255 (2009).
419. See ACTA, supra note 6, art. 23.1 ("Each Party shall provide for criminal proce-
dures and penalties to be applied at least in cases of willful trademark counterfeiting or
copyright or related rights piracy on a commercial scale. For purposes of this Section, acts
carried out on a commercial scale include at least those carried out as commercial activities
for direct or indirect economic or commercial advantage.").
420. WORLD TRADE ORG., supra note 390.
421. See Manta, supra note, 18, at 480 ("IP infringement does not tend to endanger the
safety of an owner like some property crimes do. The non-rivalrous nature of IP also
means that an infringer cannot completely deprive the owner of a good, unless she also
commits an accompanying property crime such as the theft of all copies of a manuscript.").
422. TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP, supra note 411, art. 8.1 ("Each Party shall make
patents available for any invention, whether a product or process, in all fields of technol-
ogy, provided that the invention is new, involves an inventive step, and is capable of indus-
trial application.15 In addition, the Parties confirm that: patents shall be available for any
new forms, uses, or methods of using a known product; and a new form, use, or method of
using a known product may satisfy the criteria for patentability, even if such invention does
not result in the enhancement of the known efficacy of that product.").
423. See id.
424. See Janice M. Mueller & Donald S. Chisum, Enabling Patent Law's Inherent Antic-
ipation Doctrine, 45 Hous. L. REv. 1101, 1106 (2008).
425. TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP, supra note 411, art. 8.2.
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peutic, and surgical methods for the treatment of humans or animals. 4 2 6
By contrast, TRIPS specifically provides that WTO members may ex-
clude plants and animals and diagnostic, therapeutic, and surgical meth-
ods for the treatment of humans or animals from patentability.427 Clearly,
as requested by U.S. intellectual property industries, the TPP aims to es-
tablish standards that surpass TRIPS requirements, while using TRIPS as
a baseline. 428
Due to the secrecy of the TPP negotiations, it is difficult to fully assess
the potential impact of this agreement. 429 However, increased intellectual
property standards and enforcement are amongst the U.S. intellectual
property goals for the TPP.430 Utilizing public interest as the standard
against which to assess the intellectual property provisions in these
TRIPS Plus agreements may cause the balance to shift away from in-
creased protections and increased enforcement of existing or higher stan-
dards. For instance, government enforcement of copyright-protected
films is not related to public safety.431 Thus, government enforcement of
copyrighted works should not be subsumed under the broader health and
safety justification that is advanced with respect to counterfeit
medicines. 432 Rather, the copyright concerns should be isolated in order
to ascertain the interests at stake, including whether there is any perti-
nent public interest served by mandating government enforcement of
copyright. 433 Due to the secrecy of the negotiations, the affected citizens
are not able to participate in shaping the outcome.434 However, a set of
clear and transparent standards may help alleviate concerns about
whether negotiating governments are representing the interests of their
citizens or the interests of industry stakeholders to the detriment of their
citizens.435
If agreements like the TPP, or the recently announced Trans-Atlantic
Trade and Investment Partnership,436 will provide for increased intellec-
426. Id. ("Each Party shall make patents available for inventions for the following: (a)
plants and animals, and (b) diagnostic, therapeutic, and surgical methods for the treatment
of humans or animals.").
427. TRIPS, supra note 18, art. 27.3 ("Members may also exclude from patentability:
(a) diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of humans or animals;
(b) plants and animals other than micro-organisms, and essentially biological processes for
the production of plants or animals other than non-biological and microbiological
processes.")
428. Outlines of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, OFFIcE U.S. TRADE REP.,
http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/fact-sheets/2011/november/outlines-trans-pacific-
partnership-agreement.
429. David S. Levine, Bring in the Nerds: Secrecy, National Security, and the Creation of
International Intellectual Property Law, 30 CARDOzo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 105, 127-31 (2012).
430. Outlines of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, supra note 428.
431. Manta, supra note 18.
432. See Rierson, supra note 148, at 434-35.
433. As indicated earlier, the relevant public interest will differ depending on the na-
ture of the industry, and the kind of intellectual property at issue.
434. See Levine, supra note 429, at 151.
435. Id.
436. In February 2013, the European Union and the United States announced that they
will commence negotiations on a trans-Atlantic partnership to liberalize trade and invest-
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tual property enforcement, it is essential to foster transparency regarding
the rationales for such enforcement. 437 It is easy to minimize potentially
less popular justifications for government enforcement of intellectual
property by emphasizing public welfare-related justifications, such as the
safety of the medicine supply. Governments need to be clear about when
and how an identifiable public interest is being protected.438
VIII. CONCLUSION
The standardized intellectual property rights created under TRIPS
have been criticized on many levels.4 3 9 In particular, the impact of these
rights on access to medicines offers a persuasive argument against the
ratcheting up of intellectual property rights.440 Additionally, the poten-
tially detrimental impact of overzealous intellectual property protection
on access to knowledge is an important part of the critique. 441 Nonethe-
less, the life and death nature of the medicines debate has been a more
powerful tool for pressuring intellectual property industries and their ad-
vocates to respond and adjust.44 2 On the other hand, the dangerous na-
ture of counterfeit medicines provides intellectual property industries a
powerful counter-narrative to the access to medicines critique of intellec-
tual property. 443
In light of the balancing provisions of TRIPS,444 subsequent interna-
tional agreements should retain sufficient flexibility to enable all nations
ment rules. No details as to possible content of this agreement as available at this time.
Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative, U.S., EU Announce De-
cision to Launch Negotiations on a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (Feb.
13, 2013), available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2013/febru-
ary/statement-US-EU-Presidents.
437. See David S. Levine, Transparency Soup: The ACTA Negotiating Process and
"Black Box" Lawmaking, 26 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 811, 813-15 (2011).
438. See id.
439. Robert M. Sherwood, Symposium, Some Things Cannot Be Legislated, 10 CAR-
DOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 37, 40 (2002) ("The TRIPS Agreement was the result of a
compromise among sharply divided countries and does not reflect a robust level of protec-
tion."); Maskus & Reichman, supra note 67, at 286 ("[S]erious questions arise as to the
sustainability of the attempt in TRIPS to resolve the international externality of protecting
new knowledge goods."); Reichman & Dreyfuss, supra note 68, at 92 ("The dynamics of
TRIPS and the post-TRIPS trade agreements teach that even a development-sensitive ne-
gotiation process is likely to produce an instrument that furthers interests of developed
countries at the expense of poorer, less powerful participants.").
440. Reichman & Deyfuss, supra note 68, at 91-92, 95-96.
441. See, e.g., Molly Beutz Land, Intellectual Property Rights and the Right to Participate
in Cultural Life (Inst. for Info. Law & Policy Ser. 08/-09 #2, 2008), available at http://www
.ssrn.com/abstract=1475430 ("Intellectual property rights can restrict the ability of individ-
uals to participate in cultural life by limiting their access to cultural goods."); Shaver supra
note 166, at 121; Lea Shaver & Caterina Sganga, The Right to Take Part in Cultural Life:
On Copyright and Human Rights, 27 Wis. INT'L L.J. 637, 639 (2010).
442. Although there have been discussions about access to knowledge at WIPO and
elsewhere, there is still no declaration or draft treaty that is comparable to the Doha Dec-
laration on TRIPS and Public Health. See Sisule F. Musungu, The Third Access to Knowl-
edge (A2K3) Conference, WIPO MAG., December 2008, http://www.wipo.int/wipo-maga
zine/en/2008/06/article 0007.html; Cahoy, supra note 83, at 426.
443. Rierson, supra note 148, at 434-35.
444. See TRIPS, supra note 18, arts. 7 & 8.
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to implement intellectual property laws and policies that suit their na-
tional circumstances. 445 This proposal is consistent with the spirit of
TRIPS, which was the first agreement to establish global intellectual
property standards. 446 New obligations that impinge on domestic policy
choices must be adequately justified. 447 Intellectual property laws could
be part of a broader solution aimed at curbing the circulation of counter-
feit medicines. Arguably this is consistent with a public interest approach
to intellectual property law that should be encouraged and promoted. Yet
the role of intellectual property law in combating counterfeit medicines
has been exaggerated. Regrettably, the notion that increased government
monitoring and enforcement of these private rights will help promote
public health and safety is based more on rhetoric than reality. While we
may all agree that counterfeit medicines crimes are serious and warrant
harsh penalties, the harm caused by counterfeit drugs does not provide as
compelling a case for an increased government role in intellectual prop-
erty enforcement, as it may initially seem.
First, although counterfeiting can be prosecuted as an intellectual prop-
erty crime, the use of intellectual property laws is not an ideal solution.448
Yes, intellectual property laws can contribute to the efforts to curb the
trade in counterfeit medicines. In particular, intellectual property inter-
ests and health concerns may overlap to the extent that consumers rely
on trademarks, for example, as an indication of safety. 449 However, pack-
aging may be legitimate while the drugs are not.4 50 In such cases, tracking
the packaging does nothing to control the distribution of the fake
drugs.451 Second, using health and safety to characterize all counterfeit
goods as dangerous enables intellectual property producers to obtain
state-enforced protection for goods protected by intellectual property,
such as fake designer purses or clothing, for which there may be no health
or safety concern. In such instances, there is no apparent reason why the
government, rather than the right holder, should enforce the rights. In
fact, this could lead to overly stringent protection of intellectual property
and impede the distribution of safe products, such as legal generic drugs,
which would otherwise enhance the public welfare. Thus, where there is a
non-health-related public interest justification for government enforce-
ment of intellectual property rights, the justification should be clearly
articulated. 452
Whatever the goals in a particular international agreement, trans-
parency with respect to the process and the substantive rationale for the
445. Gibbons, supra note 358, at 972-73.
446. See TRIPS, supra note 18, arts. 1, 7-8.
447. See Dreyfuss & Lowenfeld, supra note 24, at 302-03.
448. Earle et al., supra note 82, at 732.
449. Bunker, supra note 26, at 495-99, 506-08.
450. See Donald deKieffer, Trojan Drugs: Counterfeit and Mislabeled Pharmaceuticals
in the Legitimate Market, 32 AM. J. L. & MED. 325, 346 (2006).
451. Id.
452. The Washington Declaration on Intellectual Property and the Public Interest, 28
AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 19, 26-27 (2012).
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agreement is critical to the ability of the affected citizens to contribute to
the dialogue. Information about the rationale for government action af-
fects the capacity of citizens to participate in shaping domestic laws that
are consistent with their national values.453 For instance, a nation may
rationally choose to protect copyright-dependent industries through gov-
ernment enforcement of copyrights. 454 However, if a government aims to
support copyright industries while purporting to make decisions based on
health and safety, there is a lack of transparency and accountability. 455 In
such instances, national values are rendered irrelevant.456 For example,
there might be widespread support in a particular country for govern-
ment enforcement of intellectual property rules to combat counterfeit
medicines, but the citizens of the same country may not support broad
government enforcement provisions that also limit access to knowledge
goods or cultural products.457
Arguably, it is not meaningful to have intellectual property standards
without corresponding enforcement of those standards. A balanced intel-
lectual property system can play a positive and important role in society
by rewarding creativity and inventiveness. 458 Thus, the matter of enforce-
ment provisions in international intellectual property agreements is not a
question of whether to enforce intellectual property rights; rather, it is a
question of to whom this responsibility should fall. As a general rule, the
intellectual property owner is responsible for monitoring and enforcing
his or her rights. 459 Private enforcement is preferable for a number of
reasons, including the ability of individuals to more effectively avail
themselves of legitimate exceptions to intellectual property rights. 460
Although there is a trend toward greater government enforcement of
intellectual property rights through multilateral agreements, this in-
creased enforcement is poorly justified, and often used to rationalize gov-
ernment enforcement for all intellectual property-protected goods, even
though the public interest rationale may actually relate to a narrow subset
of goods, such as medicines. Consistent with the balance reflected in Arti-
cles 7 and 8 of TRIPS,461 this Article has argued for a public interest test
as a barometer for determining when state enforcement of intellectual
property rights is warranted. This public interest approach can assist in
reframing the discussions about intellectual property enforcement,
thereby promoting greater transparency in the development of interna-
453. See OseiTutu, supra note 31, at 1657.
454. See id.
455. See id.
456. See id.
457. See id.
458. Land, supra note 441.
459. Cf IpVenture, Inc. v. Prostar Computer, Inc., 503 F.3d 1324, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
460. When the state enforces intellectual property rights at the border, for instance,
goods that are allegedly infringing would be detained ex officio, which gives the intellectual
property owner the upper hand.
461. See TRIPS, supra note 18, arts. 7 & 8.
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tional and domestic intellectual property law and policy. It will also help
to ensure that the net that is cast to capture dangerous intellectual prop-
erty infringement is not overly broad.
